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MODELS AND MULTIPLICITIES: LOGICAL PICTURES IN HERTZ AND
WITTGENSTEIN
Joshua Eisenthal, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2018
The most long-standing division amongst interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
is between ontologically-oriented and logically-oriented interpretations. On an ontologically-
oriented interpretation, the Tractatus introduces unfamiliar entities—simple objects consti-
tuting logically independent states of affairs—in order to account for the sense of colloquial
sentences. On a logically-oriented interpretation, in contrast, the sense of colloquial sentences
is presupposed, and Tractarian simple objects do not play a special explanatory role.
I show that an unprecedented argument in favour of a logically-oriented interpretation
emerges from an appreciation of the influence of Heinrich Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics,
particularly Hertz’s notion of a dynamical model. According to Hertz, a dynamical model
captures all of the essential content of a mechanical description. On this view a pendulum, a
mass on a spring, and a vibrating string are all instantiations of the same mechanical system
because they can all be represented by the same dynamical model. I show that understand-
ing the central role of dynamical models in Principles provides crucial insights into Hertz’s
project as well as its influence on Wittgenstein. Just as Principles provides the analytic
resources needed to bring out the essential content of mechanical descriptions, the Tracta-
tus provides the analytic resources needed to bring out the essential content of colloquial
sentences. Despite certain appearances to the contrary, neither Hertz nor Wittgenstein was
arguing for the existence of unfamiliar ontological entities. Rather, they were aiming to dis-
play the significant content of ordinary descriptions—in classical mechanics and in natural
language respectively.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
‘A doubt which makes an impression on our mind cannot be removed by calling it meta-
physical: every thoughtful mind as such has needs which scientific men are accustomed to
denote as metaphysical.’
Heinrich Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, p. 23
1.1 HERTZ AND WITTGENSTEIN
Although it is uncontroversial that Hertz was an important influence on Wittgenstein, his
influence has mostly been treated quite peripherally. However, there are some striking pieces
of textual evidence which indicate that Hertz’s work may have had a more profound impact on
Wittgenstein than is generally appreciated. Not only is Hertz’s name one of the few to appear
in the Tractatus,1 Wittgenstein also considered using a quotation from Hertz’s Principles of
Mechanics as the motto for the Philosophical Investigations.2 Besides this, Wittgenstein
also made some rather grand attributions to Hertz’s influence. One such attribution is a
remark that Wittgenstein made during a talk to the Moral Sciences Club in 1939, saying
that a passage from Principles seemed to him to sum up philosophy.3 Another is a more
autobiographical expression of a similar sentiment in The Big Typescript : ‘In the way I do
1Cf. Kjærgaard (2002).
2Cf. Janik (2000) p. 149.
3Cf. McGuinness (2002a) ix and Kjærgaard (2002), p. 126.
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philosophy, the whole task lies in arranging the expression in such a manner that convincing
problems/insecurities disappear ((Hertz.))’4 A further important piece of textual evidence
is the following remark, in which Wittgenstein explicitly cited his influences (seemingly in
chronological order):
I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking.
I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by
someone else and I have done no more than passionately take it up for my work of clari-
fication. This is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Weininger,
Spengler, and Saffra have influenced me. (Wittgenstein, 1984, p. 16e)
This remark indicates that Wittgenstein picked up at least one ‘line of thinking’ from Hertz.
An overarching aim of this thesis will be to uncover such a line of thinking in the Tractatus.
Beginning with a wide-angle view, it is possible to identify a Hertzian influence that spans
the breadth of Wittgenstein’s philosophical career. Roughly, this influence concerns the
idea of dissolving a philosophical problem—achieving a perspective from which the problem
simply does not arise. The key passage where this idea is expressed by Hertz is probably one
of the best known from the introduction to Principles, where Hertz discusses the confusion
surrounding the term ‘force’ in classical mechanics:
...we have accumulated around the [term] ‘force’... more relations than can be completely
reconciled amongst themselves. We have an obscure feeling of this and want to have things
cleared up. Our confused wish finds expression in the confused question as to the nature
of force... But the answer which we want is not really an answer to this question. It is
not by finding more and fresh relations and connections that it can be answered; but by
removing the contradictions existing between those already known, and perhaps reducing
their number. When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the
nature of force will not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to
ask illegitimate questions. (Hertz, 1899, pp. 7-8)
Indeed, it is from this passage that Wittgenstein considered taking the motto for the In-
vestigations. But the idea that philosophical problems should be dissolved rather than solved
can also be recognised in the framing remarks of the Tractatus : in the preface, Wittgenstein
says, ‘The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason
why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood.’ Then, on
the last page of the book, we have the following:
4Cf. ibid, p. 125
2
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. sentences of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do
with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical,
to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his sentences.
(6.53)5
The idea that philosophical problems are not genuine problems—and hence need to be
dissolved rather than solved—is also evident at other important points in the text (cf. 4.003
in particular—‘And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems
at all’). Hence it is easy enough to see that, both early and late, Wittgenstein took a
characteristically indirect approach to the kinds of philosophical problems he engaged with.
Promising as this may be, what has been said so far has remained at a high level of
abstraction. What is wanted is a close study of what Hertz had in mind when writing
the above passage in the introduction to Principles, particularly what he meant when he
said: ‘It is not by finding more and fresh relations and connections that [our confused
question] can be answered; but by removing the contradictions existing between those already
known, and perhaps reducing their number.’ We will need to understand how exactly Hertz
regarded himself as having achieved this with the concept of force through his reformulation
of mechanics. We will then be in a position to explore why Wittgenstein was so drawn to
Hertz in this regard, and saw his own work as following upon it.
1.2 REAPPROPRIATING HERTZ
Besides influencing Wittgenstein, Principles has had a significant influence on philosophy
more broadly. Though Hertz’s formulation of mechanics never “caught on”,6 his book was
widely read by physicists at the time, and the philosophical introduction has had a lasting
impact on philosophers of science ever since.7 However, there are reasons to suspect that
5Following convention, references to the Tractatus will be given by citing the line number. The translation
used, with occasional modifications, is Pears and McGuinness (Wittgenstein, 1994).
6It is important to note that Hertz knew full well that Principles would make for a very poor textbook
on mechanics, and had no ambitions for it to catch on in that sense. Indeed, Hertz had no qualms with the
traditional presentation of mechanics for such purposes; cf. Hertz (1899), p. 40.
7See in particular the collection of papers in Baird et al. (1998).
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some major aspects of Principles have been widely misunderstood.
Hertz is generally regarded as one amongst several of the major philosopher-scientists
at the end of the nineteenth century who attempted to eliminate the notion of force from
classical mechanics. The following passage from Max Jammer’s Concepts of Force is repre-
sentative of this amalgamation of nineteenth century attitudes towards the foundations of
physics:
Just as Maxwell conceived electromagnetic forces as due to the motion of concealed masses,
or as Lord Kelvin reduced these effects to a mechanism of vortex atoms and Helmholtz to
cyclical systems of concealed motion, so Hertz thought it necessary to account not only for
electrodynamic forces, but also for gravitational forces, for all actions at a distance, and
finally for all mechanical forces, by some mechanism of concealed masses and motions. But if
such a approach is capable of gradually eliminating the mysterious forces from mechanics,
declares Hertz, it should be possible entirely to prevent their entering into mechanics.
(Jammer, 1999, p. 224)
The motivation for eliminating forces from mechanics is typically made out by appealing to
the unobservability of forces, in contrast with the observable motions of masses. However,
I will argue that such an interpretation of Hertz’s motivation for writing Principles is not
correct.
It is true enough that many of those working in physics at the end of the nineteenth
century problematized the foundations of mechanics, and criticised the Newtonian definition
of force.8 Influenced in particular by the idea of the ether, various intricate mechanisms were
suggested to account for the transmission of action-at-a-distance forces. More grandly, the
‘energeticists’ Wilhelm Ostwald and Georg Helm took energy to be primitive, and sought to
show that force was a derived concept. Hertz himself, after critiquing both the traditional
and energeticist formulations, took just space, time and mass as the primitive notions, and
proceeded to recover the content of classical mechanics in supremely systematic fashion.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, Hertz begins his introduction to Principles not with a
discussion of mechanics but with a general “picture theory” of representation:
The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our conscious knowledge
of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation of future events, so that we may
arrange our present affairs in accordance with such anticipation. As a basis for the solution
of this problem we always make use of our knowledge of events which have already occurred,
8In this vein, Hertz himself cites Mach, Lodge, and Thomson and Tait (cf. Hertz (1899), p. 8).
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obtained by chance observation or by prearranged experiment. In endeavouring thus to
draw inferences as to the future from the past, we always adopt the following process. We
form for ourselves pictures [Bilder ] or symbols of external objects; and the form which
we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the pictures in thought are always
the pictures of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured... We are thus
enabled to be in advance of the facts, and to decide as to present affairs in accordance with
the insight so obtained. The pictures which we here speak of are our conceptions of things.
With the things themselves they are in conformity in one important respect, namely, in
satisfying the above-mentioned requirement. For our purposes it is not necessary that they
should be in conformity with the things in any other respect whatever. As a matter of fact,
we do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our conceptions of things
are in conformity with them in any other than this one fundamental respect. (Hertz, 1899,
p. 1)
Hertz’s single fundamental requirement on pictures is linked to his emphasis on an-
ticipating future events: the necessary consequents of a picture must give pictures of the
consequents of what is represented. However, Hertz also makes the bold claim that we can-
not know, even in principle, whether our conceptions of things are correct in any further
sense. This epistemological modesty plays a fundamental role in shaping Hertz’s formula-
tion of mechanics. Hertz’s notion of a picture (Bild) is not something visualizable; it is not
some sort of imaginative aid for grasping an otherwise abstract idea. Indeed, insofar as such
pictures do inevitably play a role in our theorizing, Hertz regards them as distracting from
the essential content of a theory.9 As I will be concerned to argue in chapter 2, Hertz’s own
formulation of mechanics is notably austere, just sufficient to provide abstract representa-
tions of the motions of mechanical systems in the form of dynamical models. A major theme
of this thesis is that an adequate understanding of Hertz—not to mention an adequate un-
derstanding of Hertz’s influence on Wittgenstein—requires appreciating the sense in which
Hertzian pictures are logical pictures.
In understanding Hertz’s motivations for writing Principles, it is important to note that
Hertz was not challenging the correctness of the traditional formulation of mechanics, and
had no expectations that his own formulation would replace it. Rather, what Hertz found
unsatisfactory in the traditional formulation was the lack of logical perspicuity. In particular,
Hertz went to some effort to impress upon his readers that there was a ‘logical obscurity’ in
9Cf. Hertz (1893), p. 28: ‘scientific accuracy requires of us that we should in no wise confuse the simple
and homely figure, as it is presented to us by nature, with the gay garment which we use to clothe it.’
Compare this with 4.002 in the Tractatus, quoted below.
5
the Newtonian conception of force, stemming from a subtle ambiguity in Newton’s laws of
motion:
The force spoken of in [Newton’s] definition and in the first two laws act upon a body in
one definite direction. The sense of the third law is that forces always connect two bodies,
and are directed from the first to the second as well as from the second to the first. It
seems to me that the conception of force assumed and created in us by the third law on
the one hand, and the first two laws on the other hand, are slightly different. This slight
difference may be enough to produce the logical obscurity... (Hertz, 1899, p. 6)
The tension that Hertz believes he has identified between the conception of force operative
in Newton’s third law, and the slightly different conception operative in Newton’s first two
laws, will be analysed in detail below.10 But it is worth noting immediately that Hertz does
not express a concern that the notion of force is problematic per se, and in particular he
does not express a concern that it is problematic because it is unobservable.
The final task that Hertz sets himself in his introduction is to provide an outline of
his own formulation of mechanics. He first notes that it seems impossible to describe the
behaviour of observable things in a lawlike way unless some reference is made to ‘other,
invisible things’:
We soon become aware that the totality of things visible and tangible do not form a universe
conformable to law, in which the same results always follow from the same conditions.
We become convinced that the manifold of the actual universe must be greater than the
manifold of the universe which is directly revealed to us by our senses. (Hertz, 1899, p. 25)
Hence we are forced to postulate something beyond what is directly observable, and
the notion of force in the traditional formulation of mechanics, or energy in the energeticist
formulation, are paradigm examples of such invisible things. What is distinctive in Hertz’s
approach is that he instead postulates the existence of hidden masses. Hertz argues that
there may be no need to postulate the existence of anything of a fundamentally different
nature from the masses in motion that we do observe. Beginning with definitions of just
time, space and mass, Hertz is then able to capture the core empirical content of mechanics
in a single ‘fundamental law’:
Fundamental Law. Every free system persists in its state of rest or of uniform motion in
a straightest path. (§309)
10See chapter 3 section 3.3.
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The power of Hertz’s fundamental law stems from the rich notion of a ‘straightest path’. This
is the straightest path in a system’s configuration space—an abstract, high-dimensional space
which incorporates information concerning the essential characteristics of the mechanical
system at hand.11 Hertz then offers the following explanation for how the notion of force
will reemerge in this context:
We soon find it convenient to introduce into our system the idea of force. However, it is not
as something independent of us and apart from us that force now makes its appearance, but
as a mathematical aid whose properties are entirely in our power. It cannot, therefore, in
itself have anything mysterious to us. Thus according to our fundamental law, whenever two
bodies belong to the same system, the motion of the one is determined by that of the other.
The idea of force now comes in as follows. For assignable reasons we find it convenient to
divide the determination of the one motion by the other into two steps. We thus say that
the motion of the first body determines a force, and that this force then determines the
motion of the second body. In this way force can with equal justice be regarded as being
always a cause of motion, and at the same time a consequence of motion. Strictly speaking,
it is a middle term conceived only between two motions. According to this conception the
general properties of force must clearly follow as a necessary consequence of thought from
the fundamental law; and if in possible experiences we see these properties confirmed, we
can in no sense feel surprised, unless we are skeptical as to our fundamental law. Precisely
the same is true of the idea of energy and of any other aids that may be introduced. (Hertz,
1899, p. 28)
In articulating clearly how the notion of force follows from the fundamental law, Hertz
claims that Principles avoids the logical obscurity that is present in the customary represen-
tation of mechanics. Hence it should already be clear that it would be overly hasty to regard
Hertz as engaged in the enterprise of simply eliminating the notion of force from mechanics.
In spelling this out in further detail, however, I will be concerned to scrutinize the issue that
Hertz did take with the traditional Newtonian formulation. These issues will be discussed
in chapter 3.
1.3 HERTZ AND THE TRACTATUS
The first explicit reference to Hertz in the Tractatus is the following:
11See below, chapter 2 section 2.3.2
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4.04 In a sentence there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as there are in the
situation that it represents.
The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity. (Compare Hertz’s
Mechanics on dynamical models.)
One point of immediate note is that this remark refers to a series of passages set deep in
the technical bulk of Principles (specifically §§418–428, about two thirds of the way through
the book). Most commentary that discusses the connection between Hertz and Wittgenstein
only considers Hertz’s introduction, but the reference to dynamical models here not only
suggests that Wittgenstein studied the entire text but also suggests that he drew inspiration
from Hertz’s mechanics taken as a connected whole.
The notion of multiplicity that Wittgenstein mentions at 4.04 is obscure. As a first ap-
proximation, the ‘distinguishable parts’ of a sentence are whatever grammatical components
play some role in allowing it to express its sense. Wittgenstein also refers to the ‘constituent
parts’ of a sentence at 4.024, and there is a brief ensuing discussion of the translation of indi-
vidual words at 4.025 (indeed, at 4.026 words are referred to directly as ‘simple signs’). 4.032
reminds us, however, that we should not think too crudely of distinct words as corresponding
directly to the grammatical components of a sentence (as the separate roles played by the
stem and ending of ‘Ambulo’ makes clear). But if we are to think of the true constituent
parts of a sentence as Tractarian names, i.e. the simple signs in elementary sentences, then
in fact there is a temptation to travel a great distance (via logical analysis) away from the
overt grammatical components of colloquial language.12 This, at any rate, might be regarded
as the way to connect the Tractatarian notions of elementary sentences and names (as well
as states of affairs and objects) with this section of the text, especially passages like the
following:
4.0311 One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined
with one another. In this way the whole group—like a tableau vivant—presents a state of
affairs.
4.0312 The possibility of sentences is based on the principle that objects have signs as their
representatives.
12Cf. 4.002, ‘It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer
the form of the thought beneath it’. It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein’s language here is reminiscent of a
well known remark from Hertz (1893), p. 28 (quoted above).
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My fundamental thought is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives; that
there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.
In making progress with interpreting Wittgenstein’s claim that sentence and situation
must have the same multiplicity, it will clearly be useful to see what the comparison with
Hertz’s dynamical models comes down to. In this vein it is important to note that the
passages which develop the notion of a dynamical model seem to tie together some of the
central themes of Principles. In particular, Hertz states that the only knowledge that classical
mechanics makes available is precisely the information contained in dynamical models:
We can... in fact, have no knowledge as to whether the systems which we consider in
mechanics agree in any other respect with the actual systems of nature which we intend
to consider, than in this alone, that the one set of systems are [dynamical] models of the
other. (§427)13
For immediate purposes, this is particularly important because of its connection with Hertz’s
picture theory of representation:
The relation of a dynamical model to the system of which it is regarded as the model, is
precisely the same as the relation of the pictures which our minds forms of things to the
things themselves... The agreement between mind and nature may therefore be likened to
the agreement between two systems which are models of one another (§428)
Recall that Hertz’s sole ‘fundamental requirement’ on a picture is that its necessary con-
sequents must give pictures of the consequents of what it represents. Hence it is through
the notion of a dynamical model that Hertz applies this fundamental requirement on pic-
tures in general to the pictures provided by classical mechanics in particular. On Hertz’s
view, a pendulum, a mass on a spring, and a vibrating string are all instantiations of the
same mechanical system because they are all represented by the same dynamical model.
Dynamical models thus abstract away from the ontological constituents of what they repre-
sent. Although Hertz begins Principles by giving definitions of ‘material systems’, ‘material
points’ and ‘material particles’ (Massenteilchen), he is not proposing an unfamiliar ontology
in doing so—he does not think that empirical investigation will show all mechanical systems
13From this point onwards, a section number without a further citation will be used to refer to passages from
the main body of Principles. Note that I have made occasional modifications to the published translation.
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to be composed of such entities. Rather, Hertz is building a perspicuous logical framework
within which the propositions of mechanics can be cast.14
As I will be concerned to argue in the final chapter of this thesis, understanding the
central role of dynamical models in Principles also points to a much deeper connection with
Wittgenstein’s project in the Tractatus. Interpretations of the Tractatus can be divided
into two broad camps: ontologically-oriented interpretations and logically-oriented interpre-
tations.15 On an ontologically-oriented interpretation, the Tractatus introduces unfamiliar
entities—simple objects constituting logically independent states of affairs—in order to ac-
count for the sense of colloquial sentences. On a logically-oriented interpretation, in contrast,
the sense of colloquial sentences is presupposed, and Tractarian simple objects do not play
a special explanatory role. As we will see, Wittgenstein’s reference to dynamical models at
4.04 emerges as a critical piece of textual evidence in favour of a logically-oriented inter-
pretation. Where Hertz’s goal is to provide the analytic resources to display the essential
content of mechanical descriptions, Wittgenstein’s goal is to provide the analytic resources
to display the essential content of descriptions tout court.
Recall that the upshot of doing this is supposed to be that certain misguided philosophical
problems will lose their grip on us. (To borrow a Tractarian turn of phrase: the solution is
seen in the vanishing of the problem.16) Here, again, the link with Principles is clear: Hertz’s
aim is to clarify the logic of mechanics so that ‘our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to
ask illegitimate questions’. As noted, although this theme of dissolving rather than solving
philosophical problems is one that stays with Wittgenstein throughout his career, it is its
presence in the Tractatus that will frame the overarching argument of this thesis.
14Indeed, Hertz remains intentionally agnostic about the fundamental constituents of matter and thus
side-steps the controversies of the period concerning the existence of atoms; cf. Lu¨tzen (2005), pp. 140-141.
15See below, chapter 4 section 4.1
16Cf. 6.521.
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2.0 MECHANICS WITHOUT MECHANISMS
‘Even when one continued to speak of the fundamental concepts of theoretical physics as
symbols, in order to avoid from the first any danger of ontological interpretation, there
was a necessity of attributing to these very symbols themselves a theoretical meaning and
therewith an “objective” content. Far from being merely arbitrary additions to what was
given by direct observations they became essential factors with which alone an organization
of the given, the fusion of the isolated details into the system of experience, was possible.
The first great physicist actually to complete this turn of affairs and at the same time
to grasp the full measure of its philosophical implications, was Heinrich Hertz, with whom
began a new phase in the theory of physical methods.’
Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, §V
2.1 AN UNTIMELY DEATH
On new year’s day of 1894, Hertz died just 36 years old. He had been heralded as one of the
most promising scientists of his generation—‘predestined to open up to mankind many of
the secrets which nature has hitherto concealed from us’, as Helmholtz put it (Hertz, 1899,
vii). Hertz had dedicated the last few years of his life to a grand project in the foundations
of physics, culminating in the posthumous publication of Principles of Mechanics. As he had
prepared to send the manuscript to press, Hertz expressed trepidation about how it would
be received, revealing to his parents that he had never shown it to another soul.1 When
Principles finally appeared it was received with high praise, but even as it was admired
1Cf. Hertz’s letter to his parents, 19 November 1893 (Hertz, 1977, p. 343).
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for its elegance and scope Hertz’s contemporaries could not find in it the kinds of advances
that they had hoped for. Indeed, there was a general sense of confusion regarding what
Principles was supposed to have achieved. Hertz himself, of course, could not help. As
Boltzmann lamented, at the same moment that Hertz’s book was published ‘his lips became
for ever sealed to the thousand requests for clarification that are certainly not on the tip of
my tongue alone’ (Boltzmann, 1974, p. 90).
Nevertheless, Principles went on to have a remarkable impact on both physicists and
philosophers. It has been regarded as marking ‘the beginning of modern physics’ (Mulligan,
2001, p. 151), a view defended emphatically by Cassirer and echoed more recently by van
Fraassen.2 Furthermore, almost all the leading physicists and scientifically-oriented philoso-
phers of two generations read and reacted to Principles.3 Crucially, however, almost all of
these esteemed readers found Hertz’s mechanics ‘interesting and beautiful, but either baf-
fling or unsuccessful, or both’ (Preston, 2008a, p. 100). The sweeping influence of Principles
makes the problem of finding a satisfactory interpretation of it all the more pressing, yet the
difficulties in doing so remain as acute today as they did following Hertz’s untimely death.
Hertz begins with three primitive notions—space, time, and mass—and proceeds to de-
velop a sophisticated analytical framework in which to treat the mechanical properties of
‘systems’, defined as collections of material points with connections between them (equa-
tions relating their relative positions). Hertz then posits his single fundamental law: ‘Every
free system persists in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straightest line’ (§309).
The grand claim of Principles is that the entire empirical content of classical mechanics
is captured in this single statement. However, Principles does not merely treat mechanics
more economically and systematically than previous formulations; Hertz also purports to
demystify the notions of force and energy, deriving cleaned up versions of both from the
spatial and temporal relations between masses. Hertz claims that by avoiding obscurities
in Newton’s laws of motion, certain confused questions which troubled his contemporaries
simply won’t arise.4 To achieve all this, and to apply his framework to the full range of
2Cf. Cassirer (1950) pp. 114 ff., and van Fraassen (2008) pp. 204 ff.
3Including Helmholtz, Mach, Boltzmann, Lorentz, FitzGerald, Einstein, Poincare´, Duhem, Carnap, Rus-
sell, and Wittgenstein Cf. Preston (2008a), p. 100 and Saunders (1998), p. 123.
4Cf. Hertz (1899) p. 8.
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mechanical phenomena, Hertz introduces the notion of hidden masses :
If we wish to obtain an picture of the universe which shall be well-rounded, complete, and
conformable to law, we have to presuppose, behind the things which we see, other, invisible
things—to imagine confederates concealed beyond the limits of our senses... We are free
to assume that this hidden something is nought else than motion and mass again, motion
and mass which differ from the visible ones not in themselves but in relation to us and to
our usual means of perception. (Hertz (1899) p. 25)
However, it is here that we encounter the confused reaction of Hertz’s readers. Helmholtz,
in the introduction he wrote for Principles, remarked: ‘Unfortunately [Hertz] has not given
examples illustrating the manner in which he supposed such hypothetical mechanisms to act;
to explain even the simplest cases of physical forces on these lines will clearly require much
scientific insight and imaginative power’ (Hertz, 1899, xx). Boltzmann went to considerable
effort to try to construct the mechanisms that Hertz had apparently left out but without suc-
cess, remarking: ‘so long as even in the simplest cases no systems or only unduly complicated
systems of hidden masses can be found that would solve the problem in the sense of Hertz’s
theory, the latter is only of purely academic interest’ (Boltzmann, 1974, p. 90). And Mach
was particularly pointed in drawing attention to the fact that such Hertzian mechanisms
would oblige one ‘to resort, even in simplest cases, to fantastic and even frequently question-
able fictions’ (Mach, 1960, p. 323). Modern commentators have been similarly unanimous in
complaining about the difficulties of finding plausible Hertzian mechanisms. Lu¨tzen remarks,
‘If Hertz had lived he would certainly have been hard pressed for a reaction to this problem’
(Lu¨tzen, 2005, p. 278), or as Mulligan puts it, ‘This criticism is quite valid and undoubtedly
carried great weight with physicists in the decade after 1894’ (Mulligan, 1998, p. 178).
The central goal of this chapter will be to resolve this persistent tension in interpreting
Hertz’s book. To begin, I will situate Principles in its historical context and identify the
widespread tendency to regard Hertz’s project as closely connected with the search for an
ether mechanism. I will argue that this tendency has contributed to the confusion and
dissatisfaction amongst Hertz’s readers because it ties the value of his project to the prospects
of finding such a mechanism. I will then turn to discuss Hertz’s ideas concerning scientific
representation; ideas that culminated in Hertz’s “picture theory” of representation. With
Hertz’s austere account of representation in view, I will argue that it has been misleading
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to interpret Principles as closely connected with the quest for an ether mechanism, despite
passages where Hertz seems to invite such an interpretation. More specifically, I will argue
that a crucial role of Hertz’s hypothesis of hidden masses has been widely overlooked. Rather
than acting as an unwieldy proposal for the fundamental constituents of mechanical systems,
Hertz’s hypothesis rules out knowledge of such underlying entities.
2.2 THE QUEST FOR AN ETHER MECHANISM
The second half of the nineteenth century that encompassed Hertz’s short career was char-
acterized by fervent research in electromagnetism. The first volume of Maxwell’s Treatise
appeared in 1873, and Hertz’s own groundbreaking observations of electric waves in 1888
established Maxwell’s theory as canonical. For many physicists the most appealing aspect of
that theory was the way in which it seemed to eschew instantaneous actions-at-a-distance in
favour of the notion of waves propagating through a medium. Hertz’s famous experiments
were widely regarded as confirming this view of electromagnetism, and Kelvin introduced
Hertz’s collection of papers on the subject as a ‘splendid consummation’ of ‘the nineteenth-
century school of plenum, one ether for light, heat, electricity, magnetism’ (Hertz, 1893, xv).5
However, finding an ether mechanism which could account for electromagnetic phenomena
remained a critical open problem.
In seeking an ether mechanism many of Hertz’s contemporaries were inspired by the
success of the kinetic theory of gases. That conception of a gas—a swarm of billiard-ball
like atoms, colliding with each other according to ordinary Newtonian mechanics—had been
extremely successful in both accounting for thermodynamical properties and leading to novel
predictions. It was also admired for conveying a particularly satisfactory kind of understand-
ing: the model really represented what a gas was like, at least approximately. Hence a widely
held view was that it ‘ought to be possible, at least in principle, to do the same thing for the
ether: to find a mechanical model that reflected its true nature’ (Hunt, 1991, pp. 76-77).
5See also Mulligan (2001) p. 143: ‘Hertz empirically confirmed Maxwell’s electromagnetic waves; it was
universally assumed that the ether was confirmed at the same time.’
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Thus the historical context in which Principles appeared involved a plethora of increas-
ingly intricate attempts to show how some kind of material ether, governed by ordinary
mechanics, could account for electromagnetic effects. More generally, the promise of an
ether mechanism that eschewed action-at-a-distance was a defining feature of theoretical
physics around 1890, and the background against which Hertz turned to foundational work
in mechanics. Indeed, an eloquent description of this situation is due to Hertz himself:
More and more we feel that [the nature of the ether] is the all-important problem, and
that the solution of it will not only reveal to us the nature of what used to be called
imponderables, but also the nature of matter itself and of its most essential properties—
weight and inertia. The quintessence of ancient systems of physical science is preserved for
us in the assertion that all things have been fashioned out of fire and water. Just at present
physics is more inclined to ask whether all things have not been fashioned out of the ether.
(Hertz, 1896, pp. 326-327)
However, proposing a concrete ether mechanism was clearly not a direct goal of Hertz’s
book. In fact, before Principles was published Hertz had explicitly attempted to dispel such
rumours concerning what it was he was working on:
What you have heard about my works... is unfortunately without any foundation and I do
not know how this opinion has been formed. I have not at all worked with the mechanics
of the electric field, and I have not obtained anything concerning the motion of the ether.
(Hertz to Emil Cohn, November 25 1891)6
Hertz’s primary aim, as he himself emphasised, was to achieve a certain kind of clarifi-
cation of classical mechanics as it stood. The letter to Cohn continues:
This summer I have thought a great deal about the usual mechanics... In this area I would
like to put something straight and arrange the concepts in such a way that one can see
more clearly what are the definitions and what are the facts of experience, such as, for
example, concepts of force and inertia. I am already convinced that it is possible to obtain
great simplifications here. (ibid)
Thus most readers of Principles—both historical and contemporary—have regarded it as an
attempt to lay the groundwork for some future ether mechanism, the details of which could be
filled in later. But the inclination towards interpreting Principles this way has contributed to
the dissatisfaction amongst Hertz’s readers, for it ties the value of his project to the prospects
6Translations of the letter are reproduced in Lu¨tzen (2005) p. 74 and Nordmann (1998) p. 160. For an
extract of the original German text see Nordmann (1998) p. 169.
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of filling in these details. We thus encounter a crucial unanswered question: how could
Hertz’s apparent attitude towards the difficulties of constructing such a mechanism have
been so cavalier? Indeed, independently of the historical context, the content of Principles
can also seem to invite this question itself.
2.3 AN OVERVIEW OF PRINCIPLES
Before proceeding, a note on terminology. In the opening paragraphs of Principles we find
Hertz introducing ‘material particles’ and ‘material points’ in an interconnected series of
definitions, leading up to the definition of a ‘system’. The latter terms are literal translations
from the German (materieller Punkte and System respectively), but translating Hertz’s
term Massenteilchen as ‘material particle’ is misleading. Hertz’s Massenteilchen are, in
an important sense, smaller—indeed, infinitely smaller—than his material points, and this
conflicts with the ordinary understanding of ‘particles’ and ‘points’ in English. To avoid
unhelpful associations, I will use ‘Massenteilchen’ instead of ‘material particle(s)’ in what
follows.7
2.3.1 Hertz’s analytical framework
Principles is divided into two books: in the first, Hertz defines his terms and establishes an
analytical (mathematical) framework; in the second, he explains how this framework is to
be applied. The first book purports to be a priori ‘in Kant’s sense’:
The subject-matter of the first book is completely independent of experience. All the
assertions made are a priori judgments in Kant’s sense. They are based upon the laws of
the internal intuition of, and upon the logical forms followed by, the person who makes the
assertions; with his external experience they have no other connection than these intuitions
and forms may have. (§1)8
The content of the first book is supposed to be compatible with any interactions with
7In this I follow Lu¨tzen (2005), cf. p. 135
8For some discussion of Hertz’s Kantian influences, see Hyder (2002) pp. 35-46, Lu¨tzen (2005) §10, and
Leroux (2001) pp. 192-193
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spatio-temporal objects whatsoever. Thus it is only in book two that we find the one
proposition that Hertz regards as falsifiable: his fundamental law.
Following Kant, Hertz helps himself to ‘the space of Euclid’s geometry’ and ‘the time of
our internal intuition’ (§2). In the case of mass, however, there is no associated Kantian form
of intuition to appeal to, and Hertz’s avoidance of anything dependent on experience leads
to a very minimal notion: the ‘mass’ contained in a given space is defined as the relative
number of Massenteilchen in that space. Hence Hertz first defines Massenteilchen in order
to give his definitions of mass, then proceeds to definitions of material points and, finally,
systems.
Massenteilchen are represented completely by curves through space parametrized by
time:
Definition 1. A Massenteilchen is a characteristic by which we associate without ambi-
guity a given point in space at a given time with a given point in space at any other time.
(§3)
Hertz also stipulates that any number of Massenteilchen can occupy the same location at
the same time, allowing for the two definitions that follow:
Definition 2. The number of Massenteilchen in any space, compared with the number of
Massenteilchen in some chosen space at a fixed time, is called the mass contained in the
first space.
We may and shall consider the number of Massenteilchen in the space chosen for com-
parison to be infinitely great. The mass of the separate Massenteilchen will therefore, by
the definition, be infinitely small. The mass in any given space may therefore have any
rational or irrational value. (§4)
Definition 3. A finite or infinitely small mass, conceived as being contained in an infinitely
small space, is called a material point. (§5)
A material point may at first seem to be the familiar point mass by which standard pre-
sentations of mechanics routinely treat stars and atoms alike: a discrete object whose mass
can be treated as situated at a point. However, according to Hertz’s definition of mass it
must be possible for material points to contain infinite numbers of Massenteilchen if their
mass values are to range over the real numbers. Hertz claims we can do this by ‘supposing
the Massenteilchen to be of a higher order of infinitesimals than those material points which
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are regarded as being of infinitely small mass’ (§5).9 This relationship between the material
points and the Massenteilchen is suggestive of the material points in continuum mechan-
ics, which are integrated over to define the properties of continuous media. In fact, Hertz’s
introduction of Massenteilchen might have been intended, in part, as a way to preserve
conservation of mass whilst allowing for continually varying mass-densities.10
The final definition in Hertz’s first chapter is of a system:
Definition 4. A number of material points considered simultaneously is called a system
of material points, or briefly a system. The sum of the masses of the separate points is, by
§4, the mass of the system. (§6)
Systems are simply collections of material points ‘considered simultaneously’. For much of
Principles Hertz concerns himself entirely with the mechanics of material systems (cf. §121),
and shows that the connections of such a system can always be represented by ‘equations of
condition’ of a canonical form (cf. §115 ff.). A great part of the ensuing work is in setting
up the vocabulary to talk about the properties of such a system (its displacement, velocity,
acceleration, and so on), and this vocabulary finds a natural home in the context of the
configuration space associated with a system, to which we can now turn.11
2.3.2 Configuration Space
The basic idea of a system’s configuration space is straightforward. A system of n material
points has an associated configuration space with 3n dimensions—one dimension for each
of the three coordinates of each of its points—so that every location in configuration space
represents a conceivable position of the whole system. For example, the position of a system
9Although Hertz is fudging the mathematical details here, we could flesh this out on Hertz’s behalf using
modern tools. For one suggestion along these lines see Lu¨tzen (2005) p. 139.
10For a discussion of attempts that were made to extend Hertz’s framework to continuous systems, see
Lu¨tzen (2005) p. 140 and p. 286. Note that, because Hertz’s mechanics seems only directly applicable to
discrete systems, commentators have not drawn on concepts in continuum mechanics in interpreting either
Hertz’s Massenteilchen or his material points. Although this may be a mistake, a full discussion of this issue
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
11Hertz himself minimized his use of spatial language in this context, and in particular did not use the
expression ‘configuration space’. This is because Hertz was keen to play down any direct comparison between
mathematical high-dimensional spaces and physical space. For a brief discussion of this point, see Lu¨tzen
(2005) p. 110.
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of three points can be given by specifying the nine coordinates in its associated configuration
space.
When there are connections between the points there are corresponding limitations on
which regions of configuration space are accessible. Specifically, each connection rules out
the region that would correspond to “breaking” that connection. A rigid system in which no
material point can move independently of any of the others has only six degrees of freedom;
hence, no matter how many material points it has, such a system will always be located
within a 6-dimensional subspace inside its configuration space. In general, the connections
of a system always limit the accessible region of a 3n-dimensional configuration space to a
lower-dimensional subspace.12
Many of the key geometric properties of configuration space are given with its metrical
properties, which Hertz derives by first defining the ‘magnitude of the displacement of a
system’:
The magnitude of the displacement of a system is the quadratic mean value of [i.e. the
positive root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of] the magnitudes of the displacements
of all its Massenteilchen. (§§28, 29)
Note here the reference to Massenteilchen.13 If Hertz had calculated the displacements of the
material points this would have resulted in configuration space having a standard Euclidean
metric. In other words, the line element of configuration space would have taken the familiar
Pythagorean form:
ds2 =
3n∑
i=1
dx2i
However, calculating the displacements of the Massenteilchen instead of the material points
“weights” the expression for the magnitude of the displacement of a system, so that the
12In fact this is only true for holonomous connections (cf. §123). Hertz regarded it as important to
incorporate non-holonomous connections within his framework, even though he could have regarded these
as ultimately derivable from holonomous connections—cf. Lu¨tzen (2005) p. 193. In this section and the
following I mainly limit my attention to holonomous systems; for some discussion of non-holonomous systems
see Lu¨tzen (2005) §15.3.
13The need for the appearance of Massenteilchen in this definition is in fact the key reason why Hertz
included them in his framework at all. For a detailed discussion of the development of the idea of Massen-
teilchen in the early drafts of Principles see Lu¨tzen (2005) pp. 146-158.
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more massive points contribute more to the displacement.14 Hertz thus has the raw mate-
rial to develop a more exotic metric for configuration space, first moving to a definition of
infinitesimal displacement of a system (cf. §54), and then to expressions for the lengths and
curvatures of paths of systems in general (cf. §§104 ff.). This results in the line element of
configuration space having the following form:
ds2 =
3n∑
i=1
midx
2
i
Weighting the expression for (infinitesimal) displacement thus links the metrical properties
of configuration space to the particular mass distribution of the system at hand.
To appreciate the significance of this metric structure, it is helpful to approach it from a
different direction.15 If the velocity of the i-th material point is vi, the total kinetic energy
of a system is given by:
T =
1
2
n∑
i=1
miv
2
i
From here, we could define the line element of configuration space as follows:
ds2 = 2Tdt2 =
n∑
i=1
miv
2
i dt
2
As vi = (dx
2
i + dy
2
i + dz
2
i )
1
2 /dt this gives:
ds2 =
n∑
i=1
mi(dx
2
i + dy
2
i + dz
2
i )
Denoting the coordiantes of the µ-th point as (x3µ−2, x3µ−1, x3µ), and letting its mass be
equal to m3µ−2 +m3µ−1 +m3µ, we can see that we have reccovered Hertz’s expression for the
line element:
ds2 =
3n∑
i=1
midx
2
i
14For further discussion of the important role of Massenteilchen in defining the metric properties of con-
figuration space, see Appendix A.
15Here I follow Lanczos (1962) p. 22.
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Hence the total kinetic energy of the system can be written as T = 1
2
m(ds
dt
)2, where m is
the sum of the masses of the individual points. This means that the total kinetic energy
of the system can be regarded as the kinetic energy of a single point in configuration space.
Situating a mechanical problem within a configuration space of this structure thus carries
over the mechanics of a single point to the mechanics of an arbitrary system.16
If a system has no connections at all between its points it moves in a straight path in its
configuration space (which is indeed the straightest path available). Increasingly complex
systems will have an increasing number of connections between their points. As each con-
nection defines a (3n− 1)-dimensional hypersurface inside the system’s configuration space,
and as the path that a system traces out must lie on the intersection of the hypersurfaces
determined by all of its connections, every additional connection causes the system’s path
to deviate further from the straight path that it would otherwise follow. Thus every new
connection increases the curvature of the system’s path. Hertz’s fundamental law asserts
that the motion of a free system (roughly, one that can be treated as isolated) always traces
out a straightest path on this curved hypersurface, embedded within its 3n-dimensional
configuration space.17
The full elegance of Hertz’s fundamental law as a kind of generalization of the principle
of inertia is thus revealed. In Hertz’s words: ‘[the fundamental law] asserts that if the con-
nections of the system could be momentarily destroyed, its masses would become dispersed,
moving in straight lines with uniform velocity, but that as this is impossible, they tend as
nearly as possible to such a motion’ (Hertz (1899) p. 28).
2.3.3 Hidden masses and cyclical coordinates
From what has been said so far it remains opaque how Hertz’s fundamental law, on its own,
could accommodate all the varied phenomena of mechanics. Of course, many canonical me-
chanical problems concern systems that are not free, such as systems acted on by forces. To
16Cf. Lanczos (1962) p. 22: ‘In this space one point is sufficient to represent the mechanical system, and
hence we carry over the mechanics of a free particle to any mechanical system if we place that particle in a
space of the proper number of dimensions and proper geometry.’
17A system can also be described in terms of its general coordinates (cf. §13)—see below, chapter 3 section
3.4
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capture such systems within the scope of his fundamental law, Hertz allows a ‘complete’ free
system to be decomposed into subsystems, and, in particular, to contain a hidden subsystem
(cf. §429). Thus Hertz introduces the hidden masses that are particularly characteristic of
his framework. This idea plays a fundamental role for Hertz: as already noted, it is what
allows him to employ only space, time and mass as his primitive notions, and gives rise to
one of the key advantages that he believes his own formulation of mechanics has over other
formulations. For although Hertz thinks that the attempt to unify phenomena in a law-like
way inevitably requires stipulating something that is not directly observable, he makes the
case that this does not necessitate an appeal to a further primitive notion: ‘We may admit
that there is a hidden something at work, and yet deny that this something belongs to a
special category.’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 25).18
Hertz goes on, ‘What we are accustomed to denote as force and as energy now become
nothing more than an action of mass and motion, but not necessarily of mass and motion
recognisable by our coarse senses.’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 26). Here, Hertz appeals to Helmholtz’s
earlier work on cyclical systems. A cyclical coordinate is one whose effect on the properties
of a system is due only to its change, not its absolute value. A system is then called cyclical if
its energy can be approximated as a function of the rates of change of its cyclical coordinates
(cf. §§546-549). As an intuitive example, consider the spinning ring of a gyroscope.19 Each
component part of the ring is immediately replaced by its neighbour as the gyroscope rotates.
The positions of these components are thus paradigm cyclical coordinates: it is only their
rates of change that affect the gyroscope’s behaviour. Because of the conservation of angular
momentum, a closed box with a spinning gyroscope fixed to the inside will resist certain
changes in its motion, and hence such a setup could mimic the actions of an external force
field.
The mathematical tools for describing hidden cyclical subsystems can thus be used to
widen the scope of Hertz’s fundamental law, accounting for motions which would ordinarily
be explained by appealing to distant forces. In particular, Hertz treats a material system
‘acted on by forces’ as coupled to one or more other (hidden) material systems, such that
18As Nordmann notes, Hertz’s approach in this regard has an eminently respectable pedigree ‘which can
be traced back to Descartes and beyond’ (Nordmann, 1998, p. 169).
19Here I follow Wilson (2007) pp. 12-13.
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the systems have at least one coordinate in common (§450). He then defines a force as
the effect that one such coupled system has upon the motion of another (§455), and goes
on to show that defining force in this way aligns with the notion of force in customary
approaches to mechanical problems to a remarkable degree.20 However, Hertz’s notion of
force adds nothing beyond the application of the fundamental law to a system of connected
material points: every complete system is itself free and moves on a straightest path in its
own configuration space.
Thus, after deriving all the canonical treatments21 of mechanical problems within his
analytical framework, Hertz claims that Principles is ‘capable of embracing the whole content
of ordinary mechanics’ (Hertz, 1899, xxii), and that ‘no definite phenomena can at present
be mentioned which would be inconsistent with the system’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 36).
2.4 HERTZ AND ETHER MECHANISMS
At this point we can take a step back and consider the basis for the general inclination
to regard Hertz as concerned with laying foundations for an ether mechanism. Hertz’s
Massenteilchen can seem to be fundamental particles of some kind, and he proposes that
hidden cyclical subsystems can model the effects of distant forces. His project can thus seem
to bear a close relationship with certain nineteenth century attempts to model the ether. A
particularly noteworthy example is the “gyrostatic adynamic” ether mechanism proposed by
Kelvin a few years before Principles was published.22 In introducing this mechanism, Kelvin
began by describing a network of spherical atoms arranged such that each lies at the centre
of a tetrahedron of four others, linked to its four neighbours by rigid bars. The bars attach
to the atoms in such a way that their end points can slide freely on the atoms’ surfaces,
thus allowing the whole structure to have a degree of flexibility. Furthermore, each bar is
conceived as containing, along its length, two miniature gyroscopes:
20I discuss Hertz’s conception of force in further detail in the next chapter.
21Including those of Lagrange, Hamilton, d’Alembert, Gauss and Jacobi, as well as Galileo and Newton—
cf. Hertz (1899) Book 2 chapter III.
22Cf. Schaffner (1972), pp. 194-203.
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Instead of a simple bar, let us take a bar of which the central part, for a third of its length
for example, is composed of two rings in planes perpendicular to one another... Let the two
rings be the exterior rings of gyroscopes, and let the axes of the interior rings be mounted
perpendicularly to the line of the bar. (Schaffner, 1972, p. 195)23
Aligning the gyroscopes and setting them in motion gives the structure a kind of rotationally-
dependent elasticity, differing from the behaviour of ordinary elastic solids due to the fact
that the restoring forces depend on the rotations of the connecting bars away from their
original orientations. Kelvin declared: ‘This relation of the quasi-elastic forces with rota-
tion, is just that which we require for the ether, and especially to explain the phenomena of
electro-dynamics and magnetism’ (Schaffner, 1972, p. 196). Kelvin then used this structure
as the basis for a significantly more intricate mechanism, designed to produce no restoring
forces other than restoring couples in the same axes as deforming rotations.
On the standard interpretation of Principles, Hertz was clarifying mechanics with the
expectation that a mechanism like Kelvin’s would prove to be a good representation (or at
least a useful analogy) of the structure of the ether. Importantly, we can see this style of
interpretation directly informing the attempts that were made to fill in what appeared as
the gaps in Hertz’s presentation.24 These attempts aimed to give Hertz’s mechanics some
plausibility by showing that it was at least possible to construct “Hertzian mechanisms”,
crude and complicated as they might be.
Furthermore, there are certain passages in Principles which seem to suggest that Hertz
was indeed hoping for precisely the kind of ether mechanism that many of his contemporaries
were struggling to construct. The most overt such passage comes at the end of the intro-
duction, where Hertz considers the merits of appealing to connections over distant forces,
remarking: ‘the balance of evidence will be entirely in favour of the [Hertzian formulation
of mechanics] when a second approximation to the truth can be attained by tracing back
the supposed actions-at-a-distance to motions in an all-pervading medium whose smallest
parts are subjected to rigid connections’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 41). Combining this with two other
passages in which Hertz talks of ‘seeking the ultimate connections in the world of atoms’ (to
be discussed below, section 2.6), it is hardly surprising that there exists an almost universal
23For some discussion of Kelvin’s model, see Schaffner (1972) pp. 68-75 and Stein (1981) p. 319.
24For brief surveys of these attempts, see Lu¨tzen (2005) pp. 274 ff. and Preston (2008b) pp. 59 ff.
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inclination to read Principles as aiming to provide foundations for an ether mechanism. At
any rate, commentators such as FitzGerald felt no hesitation in interpreting Hertz this way:
Hertz sees in all actions the working of an underlying structure whose masses and motions
are producing the effects on matter that we perceive, and what we call force and energy
are due to the actions of these invisible structures, which he implicitly identifies with the
ether. (Hertz and Mulligan, 1994, p. 371)
Moreover, as we have seen, many modern commentators continue to interpret Principles
along the same lines:
[Hertz’s] overwhelming conviction of the importance of the aether, joined to his urge to re-
duce all physics to mechanics, eventually culminated in 1894 in the posthumous publication
of his Mechanics. (Mulligan, 2001, p. 138)25
Such interpretations make Hertz’s apparent attitude towards the difficulties of construct-
ing a concrete ether mechanism seem remarkably cavalier. Indeed, it is against this backdrop
that the problem of finding a plausible Hertzian mechanism seems acutely pressing. How-
ever, this way of reading Principles doesn’t fully take into account a crucial aspect of Hertz’s
book: the picture theory of representation articulated in the introduction.
2.5 HERTZ’S PICTURE THEORY
Commentators who have engaged closely with the philosophical content of Hertz’s introduc-
tion have recognized Hertz as a progenitor of the family of structuralist views developed
25See also Saunders (1998) p. 126: ‘my own view of the Principles is that Hertz intended to make a
methodological proposal, and that he supposed that it would be given substance by a mechanical model
of ether’; and Lu¨tzen (2005) p. 266: ‘The sole aim of the book was to establish the theoretical foundation
for a construction of such hidden systems or in other words for constructing a model of the ether’. Some
commentators have even mistakenly claimed that Principles aimed to provide a direct model of the ether,
cf. Hyder (2002) pp. 42-43: ‘the gap in Hertz’s picture of electromagnetism was occupied by the ether: How
are we to imagine its polarisation?... To fill the gap would need a picture of these hidden material systems.
Hertz’s last book, The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form, attempted to do just this.’
However, other commentators have resisted the suggestion that the goal of Principles was to lay the
groundwork for an ether mechanism. In particular, Nordmann has pointed out that as Hertz’s hidden
masses are unobservable in principle, they are ‘not subject to exploration even by physical undertakings of
the future’ (Nordmann, 1998, p. 160). Hence Nordmann suggests that Hertz’s primary focus revolved ‘around
the conceptual problems of ordinary classical mechanics’ (ibid). In a similar vein, D’Agostino has remarked:
‘Since hidden quantities cannot be observed, they belong to a pure theoretical framework’ (D’Agostino, 1993,
p. 73). I pursue a similar line of interpretation in section 2.6 below.
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by figures in the philosophy of science throughout the twentieth century. Roughly speak-
ing, such views regard the representative content of a scientific theory as stemming from its
structural features rather than from the objects that it posits. Ernst Cassirer was perhaps
the earliest commentator to recognise the importance of Hertz’s role in this regard. Far from
seeing Principles as laying foundations for an ether mechanism, Cassirer regarded Hertz’s
project as a response to the problems that had emerged in such attempts:
Every barely imaginable suggestion and combination had been exhausted in an effort to
establish [the ether’s] constitution until finally, after all endeavors had failed, a change in
the whole intellectual orientation was effected and investigators began to submit to critical
proof the assumption of its existence instead of continuing to examine into its nature.
(Cassirer, 1950, p. 89)26
More recently, Leroux (2001) and van Fraassen (2008) have also emphasized Hertz’s role in
the movement away from the mechanistic approach encapsulated in the increasingly intricate
nineteenth century attempts to find an ether mechanism. Van Fraassen even goes so far
as to say, ‘In Hertz’s, and later Poincare´’s, verdict we recognize a definite goodbye to the
interrelation of matter and ether as a live topic in physics’ (van Fraassen, 2008, p. 202).
In seeking to understand the lack of mechanisms in Hertz’s book, we need to appreciate
how Hertz’s ideas concerning representation framed his project. Although the presentation
of the ‘picture theory’ in the introduction to Principles has been relatively well-discussed
in the literature,27 it has not often been situated against the development of Hertz’s earlier
ideas.28 Hertz discussed the role of pictures (Bilder) in scientific representation at least as
early as his 1884 Kiel lectures29—a decade before Principles was published—and these ideas
continued to develop throughout his work on electromagnetism.
The Kiel lectures are important for contextualizing Hertz’s picture theory because it is
here that Hertz introduced the distinction between the essential and inessential content of a
scientific theory. Early in the lectures, Hertz discussed the desirability of gaining an picture of
26Cf. also Cassirer (1950) pp. 103 ff.
27For example, Schaffner (1970), D’Agostino (1993), Majer (1998), and Lu¨tzen (2005) §§7-9.
28A notable exception is Lu¨tzen (2005), see in particular §8. See also van Fraassen (2008) §8, especially
pp. 201 ff.
29The lectures have been published in German, “Die Constitution der Materie” (Hertz, 2013). Although
much of this material has not yet been studied in proper detail, for some initial discussion see Hyder (2002)
pp. 35-46 and Lu¨tzen (2005) pp. 97-101.
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the workings of nature without thereby ascribing to the phenomena any superfluous features
that attach to the picture via the imagination. An example where the imagination could
be misleading would be attributing a colour to an atom simply because we can’t imagine it
otherwise. In such a case, Hertz argues, we simply have to regard colour as an inessential
property, hence explicitly discount it as representing, or corresponding to, a property of the
atom itself. Eight years later, having worked hard to distill the essential content out of
Maxwell’s sprawling Treatise, Hertz famously remarked:
To the question, “What is Maxwell’s theory?” I know of no shorter or more definite answer
than the following:– Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s system of equations. Every theory
which leads to the same system of equations, and therefore comprises the same possible
phenomena, I would consider as being a form or special case of Maxwell’s theory. (Hertz,
1893, p. 21)
This is particularly important for our purposes for the following reason. In drawing
attention to the difficulty of finding plausible mechanisms within the framework of Principles,
both Helmholtz and Mach claimed that, in their own cases, they would remain content with
the analytical representation given by the relevant systems of equations.30 But the fact
that Helmholtz and Mach regarded themselves as thereby marking a contrast with Hertz is
peculiar inasmuch as Hertz’s concerns also lay precisely in the ‘essential’ content conveyed
by the relevant equations, and had done so in a consistent and sustained way for a long time
prior to his work on mechanics. In the context of his work in electromagnetism, Hertz makes
this particularly clear:
If we wish to lend more colour to the theory, there is nothing to prevent us from supple-
menting all this and aiding our powers of imagination by concrete representations of the
various conceptions... But scientific accuracy requires of us that we should in no wise con-
fuse the simple and homely figure, as it is presented to us by nature, with the gay garment
which we use to clothe it. (Hertz, 1893, p. 28)
Here, the ‘simple and homely figure’ presented by nature is the system of relations determined
by Maxwell’s equations, to which a ‘gay garment’ can be added, if desired, from amongst the
competing hypotheses about the underlying workings of an ether. More generally, Hertz’s
proposal is that when we think carefully about the picture of nature that a scientific theory
30Cf. Hertz (1899) xix-xx and Mach (1960) p. 321.
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conveys, we should attend to the essential features of that theory in its naked form. To
do this, the theory should be reformulated so that ‘its logical foundations [can] be easily
recognised; all unessential ideas should be removed from it, and the relations of the essential
ideas should be reduced to their simplest form’ (Hertz, 1893, p. 195). This is exactly what
Hertz took himself to have achieved in his theoretical work on electromagnetism before he
turned to classical mechanics.
2.5.1 The picture theory in Principles
Hertz employed his picture theory in framing the entire purpose of Principles, and also in
taking a stance from which to evaluate its success. With regard to the purpose of his book,
Hertz was helpfully explicit in articulating his overall goal:
The problem, whose solution the following investigation seeks, is this: to fill up the existing
holes and specify a complete and definite presentation of the laws of mechanics, which is
compatible with our present day knowledge, and in relation to the range of this knowledge
is neither too narrow nor too broad. (Hertz, 1899, xxi)
To understand the motivation to formulate a ‘complete and definite presentation of the
laws of mechanics’, we need to consider Hertz’s dissatisfaction with the already existing
presentations. The development of the desiderata of a satisfactory presentation, and the
comparison of the extant formulations of mechanics with Hertz’s own novel reformulation
on this basis, is the main task of his introduction. Hertz thus compares three competing
formulations of mechanics: the traditional Newtonian formulation; the more recent energetic
formulation (which attempted to derive the notion of force from the notion of energy); and
Hertz’s own formulation.
This is the context in which Hertz presents his picture theory. However, before narrowing
his focus to scientific theories (and formulations of mechanics in particular), Hertz discusses
how such pictures function in representation quite generally, beginning with the following:
The procedure which we use in order to draw deductions of the future from the past, and
thereby obtain the striven for foresight, is this: we make for ourselves inner simulacra
[Scheinbilder ] or symbols of external objects, and indeed we make them in such a way that
the necessary consequences of the pictures [Bilder ] in thought are always again the pictures
of the necessary consequences of the pictured objects... The pictures of which we speak are
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our conceptions of things; they have with the things one essential conformity, which lies in
the fulfillment of the aforementioned requirement. (Hertz, 1899, p. 1)
Hertz goes on to specify three criteria by which to evaluate pictures: permissibility
(Zula¨ßigkeit), correctness (Richtigkeit), and appropriateness (Zweckma¨ßigkeit). In brief:
Hertz’s notion of permissibility can be glossed as the demand of logical consistency. The
second criterion—correctness—is stated more precisely in the form of Hertz’s ‘fundamental
requirement’ on pictures: ‘the necessary consequences of the pictures in thought are always
again the pictures of the necessary consequences of the pictured objects in nature’. Thus
the necessary consequents of a correct picture give successful predictions of the relevant phe-
nomena. (Importantly, Hertz emphasizes that respecting the fundamental requirement is
the only ‘essential conformity’ between picture and what is pictured.) The final criterion—
appropriateness—is more subtle than the other two. Hertz distinguishes two separate strands
which speak to the appropriateness of a picture—its distinctness and its simplicity :
Given two pictures of the same object, the more appropriate of them is the one which
reflects more of the essential relations of the object than the other; the one which, we
would say, is more distinct. Of two equally distinct pictures the more appropriate is the
one which, besides the essential traits, contains the least number of unnecessary or empty
relations, which is thus the simpler of the two. (Hertz, 1899, p. 2)
Hence it is here, in the criterion of appropriateness, that we find a development of Hertz’s
distinction between essential and inessential features of a picture. According to the account
in Principles, one picture is more distinct than another if it captures more of the essential
features of what it depicts. A picture can further improve its appropriateness by being
stripped of any inessential features. Such a naked picture is thereby simpler.
Note that everything so far is meant to apply to pictures understood very broadly as
‘our conceptions of things’. It is only after he has specified the three criteria of permissi-
bility, correctness and appropriateness that Hertz turns to consider the pictures provided
by scientific theories. The key difference in the case of a scientific picture is that it must
be made clear which elements of the picture are operative in meeting the different criteria,
for only in this way is the systematic improvement of pictures possible. Nevertheless, as we
shall see, there are important ways in which Hertz’s three criteria are intimately connected.
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This becomes apparent if we examine how Hertz employed the criteria of the picture theory
in criticizing the traditional formulation of mechanics, thereby indicating what he thought
stood to be gained through his reformulation in Principles.
2.5.2 What Principles achieved
Hertz sets his three criteria to work in diagnosing what is problematic in ‘the representation,
differing in details but at root the same, in nearly every textbook which deals with the
whole of mechanics, and in nearly every lecture course which disseminates the cumulative
content of this science’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 4). In an important series of passages, Hertz presents
several reasons to doubt the logical perspicuity of the traditional formulation of mechanics.
He begins with a critique of the notion of centrifugal force before turning to three ‘general
observations’ as further evidence for his misgivings: the difficulty of expounding a rigorous
and clear introduction to mechanics, the existence of disputes over the rigour of certain
elementary theorems, and the pervasiveness of questions concerning the nature of force.
Hertz summarizes the purpose of this extended polemic as follows:
I have so severely questioned the permissibility of the picture under consideration in these
remarks that it must appear that it was my aim to dispute and eventually to deny its per-
missibility. But my aim, and my opinion, do not go so far as this. Such logical uncertainties,
which make us anxious about the reliability of the foundations of the subject, though they
really exist, have clearly not prevented a single one of the countless successes which mechan-
ics has won in its application to the facts. Thus they could not stem from contradictions
between the essential characteristics of our picture, hence not from contradictions between
those relations of mechanics which correspond to relations of things. Rather, they must be
restricted to the inessential traits, to all those aspects which we ourselves have arbitrarily
added to that essential content given by nature. (Hertz, 1899, p. 8)
What began, then, as a challenge to the permissibility of this picture is connected in the
end to problems with its appropriateness; Hertz regarded the logical tension in the traditional
formulation as stemming from inconsistencies in the inessential features of the picture. Here
we have a further indication of the importance Hertz attached to clearly identifying essential
features, and pruning down inessential features as far as possible. Crucially, what also
comes into view at this point is what Hertz thought his novel reformulation of mechanics
could achieve:
30
Perhaps our objection is not at all with the contents of the outlined picture, but rather
only with the form of their representation. We are certainly not too severe if we say
that this representation has never attained complete scientific perfection; it yet lacks quite
sufficiently sharp distinctions to distinguish what in the outlined picture arises from the
laws of our thought, what from experience, and what from our own arbitrary choices... In
this sense we grant, along with everyone, the permissibility of the contents of mechanics.
But it is required by the dignity and importance of our subject that its logical purity is not
only acknowledged with good will, but that a perfect representation would prove it (Hertz,
1899, pp. 8-9)
Hertz regarded his reformulation of mechanics as achieving two major things. The first
was that it was clear which aspects of his picture were included for the sake of each of
the three criteria. As already noted, Hertz believed the correctness of his picture came
down to the scope and validity of the fundamental law alone.31 As for appropriateness
and permissibility, the evaluation of these are interconnected. In Hertz’s presentation, the
careful introduction of the primitive notions (space, time and mass) and the choice of a
specific notational framework (the apparatus of differential geometry), along with his strin-
gent axiomatic-deductive procedure, served to highlight how the framework logically cohered
(how Hertz’s propositions depended on one another), and where certain choices were being
made (what alternative equivalent formulations of the fundamental law were possible, for
example). The overall result of this leads to the second, and most important, achievement of
the book: establishing the logical permissibility of mechanics beyond doubt. Indeed, Hertz
strenuously emphasised that clarifying the logical structure of mechanics was his fundamental
aim in writing Principles :
I think that as far as logical permissibility is concerned [the picture of mechanics I have
presented] will be found to satisfy the most rigid requirements, and I trust that others will
be of the same opinion. This merit of the representation I consider to be of the greatest
importance, indeed of unique importance. (Hertz, 1899, p. 33)
Thus we see that the sustained polemic challenging the clarity of the logical foundations of
the traditional picture of mechanics was central in Hertz’s motivations. To return to Hertz’s
preface, we have further clear confirmation of this fact:
In the details I have not brought forward anything that is new and which could not be found
31Hertz’s evaluation of his success in this regard has been disputed; for some discussion see Lu¨tzen (2005)
p. 132.
31
in many books. What I hope is new, and to which alone I attach value, is the arrangement
and presentation of the whole, and thus the logical, or, if one wants, the philosophical
aspect of the matter. My work has accomplished its objective or failed insofar as it has
gained something in this direction or not. (Hertz, 1899, xxiv)
2.6 ‘DESCENDING TO THE WORLD OF ATOMS’
We now need to address the passages in Principles where Hertz seemed to indicate that
his aim was, after all, to lay the groundwork for an eventual ether theory in precisely the
“mechanistic” sense of most of his contemporaries. As already noted, at the end of his intro-
duction Hertz considers the plausibility of distant forces compared with rigid connections,
seeming to make a direct appeal to developments in electromagnetism—and the concept of
an ether—in support of his own formulation of mechanics:
...the balance of evidence will be entirely in favour of the [Hertzian formulation] when a
second approximation to the truth can be attained by tracing back the supposed actions-
at-a-distance to motions in an all-pervading medium whose smallest parts are subjected to
rigid connections; a case which also seems to be nearly realised in the [sphere of electric
and magnetic forces]. This is the field in which the decisive battle between these different
fundamental assumptions of mechanics must be fought out. (Hertz, 1899, p. 41)
To make sense of these remarks we need to note that this passage occurs in the concluding
paragraph of the introduction (pp. 40-41), a paragraph in which Hertz takes an entirely
different stance from his discussion up until that point.32 Earlier, Hertz had been concerned
to bring out the difficulties the Newtonian picture faced with regard to its permissibility and
its appropriateness, and had had no issue at all with its correctness (indeed, he remarked ‘No
one will deny that within the whole range of our experience up to the present the correctness
is perfect’, ibid p. 9). Here, at the conclusion of his introduction, Hertz turns this on its
head:
32Some commentators have noted this fact before, including Nordmann (1998) p. 163 and Lu¨tzen (2005)
p. 118. (As Lu¨tzen puts it, ‘the last two pages of the introduction read more as a second thought than as a
conclusion’.) To my knowledge the only extended discussion of the new stance that Hertz adopts in these
concluding passages is in Preston (2008b). However, my assessment of the significance of these passages
differs from Preston’s.
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We shall put the [Newtonian] and [Hertzian] pictures on an equality with respect to per-
missibility, by assuming that the first picture has been thrown into a form completely
satisfactory from the logical point of view... We shall also put both pictures on an equality
with respect to appropriateness, by assuming that the first picture has been rendered com-
plete by suitable additions, and that the advantages of both in different directions are of
equal value. We shall then have as our sole criterion the correctness of the pictures (Hertz,
1899, p. 40)
Thus the appeal to the concept of the ether that follows is in an extremely hypothetical
context. Hertz is assuming that a project analogous to his own in Principles has been
completed on behalf of the Newtonian picture, so that it can be regarded as on a level with the
Hertzian picture in terms of its permissibility and appropriateness. For such a reformulation
of the Newtonian picture to be successful, it would have to remove the obscurities concerning
‘force’ that Hertz took himself to have circumvented in Principles. Hence Hertz does not
characterize the essential difference between these pictures in terms of a preference for distant
forces over connections or vice versa here. Rather:
...if we try to express as briefly as possible the essential relations of the two representations,
we come to this. The [Newtonian] picture assumes as the final constant elements in nature
the relative accelerations of the masses with reference to each other: from these it inciden-
tally deduces approximate, but only approximate, fixed relations between their positions.
The [Hertzian] picture assumes as the strictly invariable elements of nature fixed relations
between the positions: from these it deduces when the phenomena require it approximately,
but only approximately, invariable relative accelerations between the masses. (Hertz, 1899,
p. 41)
In the final analysis, Hertz claims that his own picture assumes exact relative displace-
ments, whereas the Newtonain picture (if it can be reformulated in a logically perspicuous
way) assumes exact relative accelerations.33 Hertz points out it is likely that only one of
these will seem plausible in the light of future accumulated data. Hence, in this context,
Hertz notes that developments in electromagnetism speak in favour of exact relative dis-
placements over exact relative accelerations, and hence (so the thought goes) future physics
may indeed vindicate the Hertzian picture. For this situation to arise, the Newtonian picture
would first have to be reformulated, and results from experimental physics would have to
make significant strides forward. But Hertz’s project in Principles is prior to all this:
33This point is noted in Nordmann (1998) pp. 161-162.
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...in order to arrive at such a decision it is first necessary to consider thoroughly the existing
possibilities in all directions. To develop them in one special direction is the object of
this treatise, an object which must necessarily be attained even if we are still far from a
possible decision, and even if the decision should finally prove unfavourable to the picture
here developed. (Hertz, 1899, p. 41, emphasis mine)
As noted, there are two other passages in Principles where Hertz refers to ‘the world of
atoms’. The first is earlier in the introduction, where Hertz responds to the worry that an
appeal to connections already assumes the existence of forces. Hertz’s interlocutor argues:
surely it is precisely the presence of certain forces that maintains such fixed connections. To
this Hertz replies, ‘Your assertion is correct for the mode of thought of ordinary mechanics,
but it is not correct independently of this mode of thought; it does not carry conviction to
a mind which considers the facts without prejudice and as if for the first time’ (Hertz, 1899,
p. 34). His point is that there is no need to account for a fixed spatial relation between
masses by appeal to forces if one is not already committed to the primacy of the latter. But
Hertz’s interlocutor pursues the matter, pointing out that all observed rigid connections in
nature are only approximate, ‘and the appearance of rigidity is only produced by the action
of the elastic forces which continually annul the small deviations from the position of rest’
(ibid). Hertz replies as follows:
In seeking the actual rigid connections we shall perhaps have to descend to the world of
atoms. But such considerations are out of place here; they do not affect the question
whether it is logically permissible to treat of fixed connections as independent of forces and
precedent to them. (Hertz, 1899, p. 34)
In the light of the previous discussion, we can see that Hertz’s remarks here do not force the
reading that his aim in Principles was to lay foundations for an ether mechanism. Note that
this is compatible with Hertz’s speculation that exact relative displacements may indeed
be found at atomic length scales. Nevertheless, Hertz is unambiguous in stating that ‘such
considerations are out of place here’.34
The final passage in which Hertz refers to the ‘world of atoms’ occurs at the end of
chapter II of Book 2:
34Though it would take me too far afield to explore this here, it is clearly relevant that Hertz saw a clear
separation between theoretical mechanics and experimental physics—cf. Hertz (1899) p. 27: ‘To investigate
in detail the connections of definite material systems is not the business of mechanics, but of experimental
physics’.
34
...in all connections between sensible masses which physics discovers and mechanics uses, a
sufficiently close investigation shows that they have only approximate validity, and therefore
can only be derived connections. We are compelled to seek the ultimate connections in the
world of atoms, and they are unknown to us. (§330)
This is, again, an accommodation of the fact that all observed rigid connections have so far
turned out to be approximate. However, this section of the text (§§327-330) in fact highlights
the way in which Hertz’s project must be regarded as separate from an investigation into
facts at atomic length scales. Here is how the passage just quoted continues:
But even if [the ultimate connections in the world of atoms] were known to us we could
not apply them to practical purposes, but should have to proceed as we now do. For the
complete control over any problem always requires that the number of variables should be
extremely small, whereas a return to the connections amongst the atoms would require the
introduction of an immense number of variables. (§330)
Hertz points out that even if we were confident in our knowledge of phenomena in the atomic
domain, it wouldn’t change our approach to mechanical problems at larger length scales. For
in the treatment of any problem (at any length scale), the free variables have to be kept
to a workable number. Indeed, it is a key feature of Hertz’s formulation of mechanics that
he can explain clearly how his fundamental law can be applied to systems in ignorance of
the microscopic details. Recall that a system’s connections identify a lower-dimensional
hypersurface within its 3n-dimensional configuration space.35 In general, one can apply the
full apparatus of Hertz’s mechanics as soon as one has identified equations of condition of
the right form. Hertz makes clear that in applying the fundamental law it doesn’t matter
at all whether these equations represent underlying connections between the fundamental
constituents of the system:
If we know from experience that a system actually satisfies given equations of condition,
then in applying the fundamental law it is quite indifferent whether these connections
are original ones, i.e. whether they do not admit of a further physical explanation... or
whether they are connections which may be represented as necessary consequences of other
connections and of the fundamental law (§328)
Hertz argues that his own formulation of mechanics simply makes perspicuous the fact
that every application of mechanics at ordinary length scales abstracts away from the un-
35As noted in section 2.3, this is only strictly true for holonomous connections.
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derlying microscopic details. This point is of fundamental importance in understanding the
role of Hertz’s hidden masses. As should now be emerging, their role in Hertz’s framework
is not to function as a proposal for the underlying microscopic constituents of systems. The
most immediate role of the hypothesis of hidden masses is that it allows Hertz to accommo-
date the motion of unfree systems within his analytical framework. However, it also plays
another crucially important role. Rather than being a proposal concerning the microscopic
constituents of systems, the hypothesis of hidden masses rules out knowledge of the funda-
mental constituents of a system. This is because the only knowledge of a system that Hertz’s
mechanics delivers is the existence of a ‘dynamical model’ of that system:
If we admit generally and without limitation that hypothetical masses (§301) can exist
in nature in addition to those which can be directly determined by the balance, then it
is impossible to carry our knowledge of the connections of natural systems further than
is involved in specifying models of the actual systems. We can then, in fact, have no
knowledge as to whether the systems which we consider in mechanics agree in any other
respect with the actual systems of nature which we intend to consider, than in this alone,
that the one set of systems are models of the other. (§427)
It is important to appreciate how abstract such dynamical models are. Hertz calls two
systems dynamical models of one another if it is possible to write down analytical repre-
sentations of them which have: (i) the same number of coordinates, (ii) the same equations
of condition, and (iii) the same expressions for the magnitude of a displacement (cf. §418).
Thus, for instance, any symmetrical rigid system is a dynamical model of any other. The
same applies to any system modeled as a simple harmonic oscillator—a mass on a spring,
a pendulum, and a vibrating string are all dynamical models of one another. Indeed, ‘An
infinite number of systems, quite different physically, can be models of one and the same sys-
tem. Any given system is a model of an infinite number of totally different systems’ (§421).
Thus it is built into Hertz’s framework that the true composition of a material system is
radically underdetermined.36
Note, here, the close relationship between Hertz’s discussion of dynamical models and
the picture theory of his introduction. When Hertz introduced the notion of an picture,
he posited one fundamental requirement: the consequences of the picture in thought must
36Among other places this point emerges in §536, where Hertz notes that it is ‘permissible though arbitrary’
to regard any material system whatsoever as composed of some number of coupled subsystems.
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give rise to pictures of the consequences of the pictured objects. This requirement was an
important limitation on how our pictures can represent things in the world: ‘we do not
know, and we have no way to learn, whether our conception of things conforms with them in
any other way, except in this one fundamental respect alone’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 1). With the
hypothesis of hidden masses Hertz has shown how this requirement on pictures in general
applies to the pictures provided by mechanics in particular. Hence it is in the discussion of
dynamical models that Hertz makes his only explicit reference back to the general picture
theory of his introduction:
The relation of a dynamical model to the system of which it is regarded as the model, is
precisely the same as the relation of the pictures which our mind forms of things to the
things themselves... The agreement between mind and nature may therefore be likened to
the agreement between two systems which are models of one another. (§428)
2.7 MECHANICS WITHOUT MECHANISMS
We began with the curious historical situation that followed the publication of Hertz’s book.
On the one hand, Hertz’s contemporaries regarded Principles as a remarkably impressive
work; on the other hand, they struggled to identify what it was that Hertz thought he
had achieved in writing it. Formulating mechanics by eschewing actions-at-a-distance in
favour of hidden masses and connections was all well and good, they thought, but without
specifying how mechanisms of hidden masses could plausibly account for observed phenomena
in concrete cases, the project was, as Boltzmann put it, doomed to be ‘only of purely
academic interest’ or, at best, ‘a programme for the distant future’ (Boltzmann, 1974, p. 90).
Our task was thus to explain the absence of mechanisms in Hertz’s book, and explain why
Hertz seemed unperturbed by the difficulties of constructing such a mechanism. The path
to the answer involved exploring the significance of Hertz’s picture theory of representation,
thereby reconstructing his rationale for distinguishing between the essential and inessential
elements of a scientific theory. This brought out Hertz’s commitment to distilling out the
bare picture of mechanics, and separating this off from any inessential elements that attach to
it via the imaginative aids we might employ in fleshing it out. Hence we saw that developing
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the kinds of mechanisms that Hertz’s readers looked for would have been anathema to Hertz’s
intentions: in identifying the essential content of mechanics he intentionally avoided making
any appeal to imaginative aids or concrete models.
We have seen that Hertz’s own rhetoric and presentation can be particularly misleading
on this issue, especially his introduction of Massenteilchen and hidden masses. The primary
concern of this chapter has been to show that, rather than being speculative ontological
posits, the introduction of such objects allowed Hertz to formulate suitably abstract descrip-
tions of mechanical systems in the form of dynamical models. Hence the core value of Hertz’s
project is not tied to the prospects of finding a suitable ether mechanism. Indeed, in this
vein it is important to bear in mind that Hertz never intended Principles to replace existing
approaches of mechanical problems:
In respect of [practical applications or the needs of mankind] it is scarcely possible that
the usual representation of mechanics, which has been devised expressly for them, can ever
be replaced by a more appropriate system. Our representation of mechanics bears towards
the customary one somewhat the same relation that the systematic grammar of a language
bears to a grammar devised for the purpose of enabling learners to become acquainted as
quickly as possible with what they will require in daily life. The requirements of the two
are very different, and they must differ widely in their arrangement if each is to be properly
adapted to its purpose. (Hertz, 1899, p. 40)37
On the proposed interpretation, Hertz’s formulation of mechanics provides only highly
abstract descriptions of mechanical systems in the form of dynamical models. The sole cri-
terion on the adequacy of a dynamical model is that it successfully models the system’s
evolution over time; hence the only ontological commitments that are relevant are the min-
imal commitments involved, for example, in recognising that both a mass on a spring and
a pendulum are simple harmonic oscillators. This, I claim, is the core and lasting value
of Hertz’s project. At the same time, however, this conclusion needs to be tempered as
an interpretation of Hertz’s authorial intentions. Despite the substantial evidence canvassed
above, it would be hard to deny that Hertz had a lingering sense that the image of mechanics
presented in Principles was tied to the empirical claim that actions-at-a-distance could be
accounted for, ultimately, in terms of contact actions. As we will see in the next chapter,
37See also Lu¨tzen (2005) p. 263: ‘Since [Hertz] could show that the usual principles of mechanics also hold
in his picture of mechanics any analysis of a mechanical problem within the usual mechanics is, in a sense,
also valid in his mechanics.’
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this can be recognised in Hertz’s distinction between Newton’s third law of motion and his
own action-reaction principle:
[Newton’s third law] is usually applied to actions-at-a-distance, i.e. to forces between bodies
which have no common coordinates. But our mechanics does not recognise such actions.
Thus in order to be able to adduce as a consequence of our proposition the fact that a
planet attracts the sun with the same force that the sun attracts the planet, it is necessary
that further data should be given as to the nature of the connection between the two bodies.
(§469)
This is also linked to Hertz’s discussion of the relative merits of appealing to exact displace-
ments over exact accelerations. Indeed, Hertz was aware that this aspect of his project was
speculative, and acknowledged that future experimental evidence might ‘finally prove un-
favourable to the picture here developed’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 41). Thus, I do not maintain that
Hertz regarded himself as prescinding entirely from substantive ontological commitments.
Nevertheless, as I will be concerned to argue in chapter 4, in order to explore Hertz’s
influence on Wittgenstein the austerely abstract interpretation of Principles is the appropri-
ate interpretation to bear in mind. For although Hertz himself had a lingering sense of the
empirical commitments that might yet distinguish between his own formulation of mechanics
and the Newtonian formulation, Wittgenstein had no such interest in the future results of
experimental physics. Before considering Hertz’s influence on the Tractatus, however, let us
first turn to a closer examination of Hertz’s treatment of the notion of force.
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3.0 A LOGICAL OBSCURITY
‘...science answers no why—it simply provides a shorthand description of the how... it
therefore follows that if mass and force are to be used as scientific terms they must be
symbols by aid of which we describe this how.’
Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, p. 306
3.1 THE NATURE OF FORCE
Hertz finds a logical obscurity (logische Tru¨bung) in the customary representation of mechan-
ics – ‘the representation, differing in details but at root the same, in nearly every textbook
which deals with the whole of mechanics, and in nearly every lecture course which dissem-
inates the cumulative content of this science’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 4). In seeking to convey this
obscurity to his readers, Hertz first examines the elementary problem of swinging a stone in
a circle to illustrate the ease with which one encounters ‘an undoubted hindrance to clear
thinking’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 5). He then offers three general observations as further evidence
for the presence of this logical obscurity. The first is the dissatisfaction felt in introduc-
ing the basic concepts and definitions of mechanics, and the desire ‘to move rapidly over
the introductory material on to examples which speak for themselves’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 7).
The second is the existence of disagreements concerning the rigor of supposedly elementary
theorems in mechanics, disagreements which ‘in a logically complete science, such as pure
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mathematics... [are] utterly inconceivable’ (ibid). The final observation is the concern felt
in the physics community over the ‘nature’ (Wesen) of force:
Weighty evidence seems to be furnished by the statements which one hears with wearisome
frequency, that the nature of force is still a mystery, that one of the chief problems of
physics is the investigation of the nature of force, and so on. In the same way electricians
are continually attacked as to the nature of electricity. Now, why is it that people never in
this way ask what is the nature of gold, or what is the nature of velocity? Is the nature of
gold better known to us than that of electricity, or the nature of velocity better than that
of force? Can we by our conceptions, by our words, completely represent the nature of any
thing? Certainly not. (Hertz, 1899, pp. 7-8)
In this chapter, I seek an account of the logical obscurity that troubled Hertz. It turns
out that this is no trivial task. FitzGerald suggested that Hertz had simply misunderstood
Newton’s third law:
Hertz seems to consider that there is some outstanding confusion in applying the principle
of equality of action and reaction, and appears to hold that by this principle the action on
the body requires some reaction in the body whose acceleration is the effect of the force. He
does not seem fully to appreciate that action and reaction are always on different bodies.
From his consideration of this, and from a general review of our conception of force, he
concludes that there is something mysterious about it, that its nature is a problem in
physics, like the nature of electricity. (Hertz and Mulligan, 1994, p. 372)
FitzGerald’s suggestion is that Hertz mistakenly thought that action-reaction force pairs act
on one body, rather than on different bodies. Arnold Sommerfeld also took Hertz’s troubles
to relate to a misunderstanding of Newton’s third law, and was thus similarly unconvinced
by Hertz’s critique.1 But this is patently unsatisfactory inasmuch as it is implausible that
Hertz had such an elementary misunderstanding of Newton’s third law and that this would
have led him to spend the last four years of his life reformulating mechanics.
In what follows I first present a close reading of Hertz’s discussion of swinging a stone in
a circle, aiming to identify an issue that does not merely demonstrate a misunderstanding on
Hertz’s part. I also draw attention to the fact that Hertz only intended to use this example
to gesture at an underlying problem, and did not intend the example to directly reveal the
logical obscurity in question. Thus in order to make further progress I turn to an exploration
of the way in which the meaning of the term ‘force’ shifted during the historical development
1Cf. Sommerfeld (1952) p. 60.
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of mechanics. It is in this shift in meaning, I claim, that the source of the logical obscurity is
to be found. I then unpack the notion of force that Hertz derives within his own framework,
and show how Hertz’s approach allowed him to circumvent the difficulties that lurked within
the customary representation of mechanics.
3.2 SWINGING A STONE IN A CIRCLE
As noted, Hertz’s first attempt to bring out the presence of the logical obscurity involves a
consideration of swinging a stone in a circle. For reference, I quote this section of Hertz’s
introduction at some length here:
Now, at first sight it may seem very far fetched that one could doubt the logical permissi-
bility of [the Newtonian formulation of mechanics]. It may seem nearly impossible that one
might come to find logical imperfections in a system which has been thought through over
and over innumerable times by the best minds. But before one gives up the investigation
altogether, one must ask whether all the best minds have really always felt satisfied with
this system. In any case one must wonder at how easy it is from the start to link to the
fundamental laws considerations which are completely ubiquitous in the ordinary parlance
of mechanics and yet which place clear thought in unquestionable difficulty. Let us try to
give an initial example. We swing a stone on a string around in a circle. We are thereby
conscious of exerting a force on the stone. This force deflects the stone from continuing in a
straight path, and if we alter this force, the mass of the stone, and the length of the string,
we find that the motion of the stone is in fact in accordance with Newton’s second law.
Now, however, the third law demands an opposing force to the force which our hand exerts
on the stone. To the question about this opposing force the familiar answer is: the stone
imparts a force back onto the hand as a result of its centrifugal force, and this is indeed
precisely equal and opposite to the force that we exert. Is, now, this mode of expression
permissible? Is that which we now call centrifugal force something other than the inertia of
the stone? May we, without destroying the clarity of our notions, take the effect of inertia
twice into account, namely first as mass, and second as force? In our laws of motion force
existed before motion and was the cause of motion. Can we pretend to ourselves that we
have declared something about this new kind of force in our laws, or that by using the
name “force” we have thereby conferred the properties of forces? All these questions are
obviously to be answered in the negative, there is nothing for us but to explain it as follows:
the description of centrifugal force as a force is improper; its name is, like the name ‘living
force’, merely a historical artifact and its retention should be apologized for rather than
justified. But what then of the demand of the third law, which requires a force that the
inert stone exerts on the hand and which wants to be fulfilled by a real force, not by a mere
name?
I do not think that these difficulties are artificial or wantonly conjured up; they impose
themselves upon us. Is not their origin to be traced back to the fundamental laws? The
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force of which we spoke in the definition and in the first two laws acts on a body in a single,
particular direction. The sense of the third law is that forces always connect two bodies
and are directed just as well from the first to the second as from the second to the first.
The notion of force in this law, and the conception which the first two laws presume and
suggest to us, seem to me to be slightly different, and this slight difference may be enough
to produce the logical obscurity whose consequences are manifest in our example. (Hertz,
1899, pp. 5-6)
Note, first of all, that Hertz does not take the example of the swinging stone to itself
expose the logical obscurity. Rather, Hertz is using the example to show that a completely
standard way of talking about an ordinary mechanical problem leads immediately to confu-
sion if subjected to scrutiny. Hertz’s discussion can be paraphrased as follows.
When swinging a stone in a circle on the end of a string, we are aware of exerting a
force with our hand. We can confirm that, in relation to the stone’s circular motion, the
magnitude of this force is consistent with Newton’s second law. However, Newton’s third law
instructs us that an equal and opposite reaction force must act from the stone on our hand.
The ordinary way to account for this reaction force would be to appeal to the centrifugal
force, acting outward from the centre of the circle. But this is unsatisfactory for the following
reason. The expression ‘centrifugal force’ is used to describe what appears as a force from
the perspective of a rotating frame of reference. It is thus a (potentially misleading) way
of describing how things appear from the perspective of an observer undergoing circular
motion. To illustrate: an insect clinging to the stone would feel as if a force was pulling
it off the surface even though no such force acts. (In the same way, an observer inside an
accelerating vehicle feels as if a force is pulling them backwards.) It is for this reason that
centrifugal force is called a pseudo-force.2 Hence Hertz argues that its name ‘is accepted as a
historic tradition... we should rather apologise for its retention than endeavour to justify it.’
However, acknowledging this simple point exposes why this way of talking about the swinging
stone is unsatisfactory. It makes clear that, as things stand, this is an unsatisfactory way to
account for the force on our hand when swinging the stone. This force does not arise because
our hand is undergoing circular motion (it isn’t), and it is certainly not a pseudo-force.
After making this brief critique of such ‘usual modes of expression in mechanics’, Hertz
then claims that these difficulties can be traced back to Newton’s laws. Specifically, Hertz
2Sommerfeld calls centrifugal and similar inertial forces ‘fictitious’, cf. Sommerfeld (1952) p. 59.
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argues that the conception of force as a cause of motion, as suggested by Newton’s first two
laws, does not fit entirely comfortably with the action-reaction forces required by Newton’s
third law. To anticipate a little of the later discussion: if we regard the conception of force
in Newton’s third law as a symmetrical and synchronous relation between two objects, then
prima facie this seems somewhat different from the conception of force as a kind of directed
power—acting from one body on another and causing motion in the latter (where the causal
relation is understood as non-synchronous, compatible with the idea that forces propagate
through space at a finite velocity, hence the force is ‘present before’ the motion that it
causes). Hertz concludes by remarking, ‘This slight difference may be enough to produce
the logical obscurity of which the consequences are manifest in the above example’ (Hertz,
1899, p. 6).
Hertz’s conclusion is tentative; he is gesturing at what he takes to be a deep-rooted
tension in the ordinary conception of mechanics, and appeals to ‘general observations as evi-
dence in support of the above-mentioned doubt.’ He continues by appealing to the existence
of similar doubts felt by others: ‘It is not going too far to say that this representation has
never attained scientific completeness... This is also the opinion of distinguished physicists
who have thought over and discussed these questions’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 8). In all of this Hertz
is only motivating the need for a logically perspicuous reformulation of mechanics, and stops
short of decisively demonstrating the need for it. Uncovering the deeper source of the logical
obscurity that Hertz gestures at is evidently left to us.
3.3 ‘THE CUSTOMARY REPRESENTATION OF MECHANICS’
In order to identify Hertz’s logical obscurity we need to appreciate Hertz’s understanding of
the domain in which it lies—the ‘customary representation of mechanics’:
This is the path by which the great army of students travel and are inducted into the
mysteries of mechanics. It closely follows the course of historical development and the
sequence of discoveries. Its principal stages are distinguished by the names of Archimedes,
Galileo, Newton, Lagrange. (Hertz, 1899, p. 4)
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Newton, unsurprisingly, plays an especially important role in the development of this repre-
sentation of mechanics. However, Hertz notes that Newton’s laws were not sufficient for the
full development of this image without the later addition of d’Alembert’s principle:
[Newton’s] laws contain the seed of future developments; but they do not furnish any general
expression for the influence of rigid spacial connections. Here d’Alembert’s principle extends
the general results of statics to the case of motion, and closes the series of independent
fundamental statements which cannot be deduced from each other. From here on everything
is deductive inference. (Hertz, 1899, p. 5)
Hertz’s brief remarks gesture at a rich and complex history leading up to the textbooks
and lecture courses of his time. It is possible to distinguish two traditions in the historical
development of mechanics: the vectorial tradition, most recognisable in Newton’s canonical
laws of motion, and the variational tradition, attributable especially to Lagrange.3 In the
vectorial tradition, the primary objects are force vectors between point-masses. Complex
systems can be regarded as arrays of such points, each pair of which has equal and opposite
central forces acting along the line connecting them. The classical law of gravity acting
between point-masses is the home territory of this tradition. By contrast, in the variational
tradition the primary object is a scalar representation of some overall property of the sys-
tem (normally, its total energy). Applications of extremal principles (which maximize or
minimize some quantity) such as the principle of least action are the home territory of this
tradition. The development of variational techniques was necessary in large part because of
the inadequacy of the vectorial approach in dealing with problems which involve constraints,
such as the motion of a bead constrained to slide along a rigid wire. The following section
outlines these two traditions and traces the historical development from Newton’s laws and
d’Alembert’s principle to the variational techniques of Lagrange and others. As will become
apparent, the term ‘force’ underwent an important shift in meaning during this period.
3.3.1 The vectorial tradition
Newton’s laws (in Motte’s translation) read as follows:
3Here I follow Lanczos (1962), cf. xvii
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Law I: Every body persists in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless
it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon.
Law II: The alteration of motion is ever proportional to the motive force impressed; and
is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed.
Law III: To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or the mutual actions
of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts. (Newton,
1729, pp. 19-20)
Newton’s use of the term ‘body’ (corpus) seems to be intended as an entirely generic and
general term, encompassing any material object whatsoever. Thus in one fell swoop Newton’s
first law identifies the inertial motions of atoms, chairs and galaxies. However an immediate
problem is that the first law is false on straightforward application to most such objects,
even those which are more-or-less isolated. Far from persisting in a ‘uniform motion’, an
object drifting in empty space might be spinning rapidly, with different parts undergoing
various oscillations. Here is the point made by Karl Pearson:
[a] body may not only be spinning about an axis, but may be, and as a general rule is,
conceived as continually changing the axis about which it spins. The “state of rest or of
uniform motion in a straight line” is thus not that which the physicist postulates to describe
the motion of a body under the action of no forces. (Pearson, 1900, p. 322)
As Pearson notes, we can nevertheless apply the law correctly to a representative point
associated with such a complex body, in particular its centre of mass. However, this is a
result that must be derived (and, in particular, a result that requires an appeal to Newton’s
third law).4 A more logically rigorous way to respond to this worry, then, would be take
the first law to apply only to point-masses. As Pearson notes, this strategy would also make
better sense of Newton’s second and third law as well. For example, the ‘equal and opposite’
demand of the third law has a straightforward interpretation: the forces are given by a pair
of vectors equal in magnitude and acting along the unique straight line that connects the
two masses but in opposite directions. By contrast, for two extended bodies there is no such
immediate way to determine at what point and in what direction the forces in question act:
...if the “change of motion” [in Newton’s second law] is to be that of a body, not a [point-
]particle, then we naturally ask which point of the body will have its motion changed in
the direction of a straight line... [Regarding the third law,] the mutual action of two bodies
is more complex than a reader just starting his study of mechanism would imagine, if he
4For a typical (and typically informal) example of this kind of derivation, see Sommerfeld (1952) p. 25.
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naturally interpreted mutual action as corresponding to mutual acceleration in some one
line. (Pearson, 1900, p. 324)
Although it would be anachronistic to regard Newton’s own formulation of his laws as
meant to apply only to point-masses, it is easy to see the appeal of a reconstruction of
mechanics that begins only with the motions of punctiform bodies. The second and third
laws can then be interpreted in a straightforward (and familiar) fashion (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Vectorial interpretation of Newton’s second and third laws
Fi = miai
Fij = −Fji
Extended bodies can be regarded as swarms or arrays of point-particles, held together by
strong forces (Figure 3.2). However, this approach rapidly becomes extremely cumbersome,
and this despite the fact that the details are largely redundant for most problems. (It’s rarely
important to know the forces between the constituent parts of a rigid body, for example,
only that the body as a whole is rigid.) More generally, the problems that can be adequately
dealt with using vectorial methods make up a relatively small portion of the broad domain
of classical mechanics: ‘For the solution of more involved problems, the geometrical methods
of vectorial mechanics cease to be adequate and have to give way to more abstract analytical
treatment’ (Lanczos, 1962, p. 7).
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Figure 3.2: Extended body
3.3.2 The variational tradition
As already noted, the incorporation of variational methods into the Newtonian framework
was made possible by d’Alembert’s principle.5 To see this, we can first consider a simple
formulation of the principle of virtual work.
Consider a system subject to given constraints, such as a connected mechanism of rigid
bars. A virtual displacement, δR, of the system is an imagined slight change of its configura-
tion consistent with the constraints, such as a small rotation without bending or breaking.
The total virtual work, δw, is the sum of the impressed forces on the moving parts of the
system, multiplied by the associated virtual displacements (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: A virtual displacement
5Variational methods evolved out of work in statics that well preceded Newton. For some discussion, see
Sklar (2013) pp. 76-79.
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δw = F1.δR1 + F2.δR2 + ...+ Fn.δRn
The principle of virtual work can be stated as follows: a system will remain in equilibrium
just in case the total virtual work of all the impressed forces vanishes :
δw =
n∑
i=1
Fi.δRi = 0
A particularly important development in mechanics was the extension of the principle of
virtual work to apply to dynamics as well as kinematics. This can be achieved by defining
the “force of inertia”, I = −ma, which can be used to transform Newton’s second law from
F = ma to F + I = 0. This in turn effectively generalises the notion of equilibrium so
that it can be applied to systems in motion: adding such forces of inertia to the impressed
forces allows an arbitrary mechanical system to be regarded as in equilibrium. Call the sum
of the impressed force and the force of inertia the effective force, F e. We now arrive at
d’Alembert’s principle6—a generalization of the principle of vitual work: the total virtual
work of the effective forces is zero for all virtual displacements :7
δw =
n∑
i=1
F ei .δRi = 0
It is relatively straightforward to use d’Alembert’s principle to derive a true variational
principle which requires the minimization of a scalar quantity. Given fixed endpoints, one
simply integrates the virtual work with respect to time:
∫ t2
t1
δw dt
If one requires that all virtual displacements are zero at t1 and t2, and defines the Lagrangian
function as the difference between kinetic and potential energy, L = T − V , one can then
derive the following identity:8
6D’Alembert’s work in this area developed an insight of James Bernoulli; see Sklar (2013) pp. 86-87 and
pp. 96-99 for some discussion.
7Note that we assume that these displacements are reversible, see Lanczos (1962) pp. 86-87
8Cf. Lanczos (1962) pp. 112-113.
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∫ t2
t1
δw dt = δ
∫ t2
t1
L dt
The vanishing of this quantity is Hamilton’s principle. In words: given fixed endpoints, the
motion of an arbitrary mechanical system always occurs in such a way that the integral of
the Lagrangian becomes stationary for arbitrary variations of the system’s configuration.
D’Alembert’s principle paved the way to a battery of variational techniques, including
the Lagrangian equations of motion and various formulations of the principle of least action.
Such variational approaches to mechanical problems are remarkably powerful, allowing one to
ascertain all the dynamical information of a system by minimizing a single scalar quantity.9
However, we have now moved a significant distance away from Newton’s original laws of
motion. In particular, we have moved a significant difference from the Newtonian conception
of force that we started with. When considering the Lagrangian for a system, we can derive
a ‘generalised’ notion of force from the potential function, V .10 However, this force will not
in general be represented by a three-dimensional vector as in the vectorial tradition; it will
typically be represented by a vector with as many components as the degrees of freedom of
the mechanical system at hand. It is this shift in the meaning of the term ‘force’ that fed
into Hertz’s concerns with the customary representation of mechanics, or so I shall argue.
3.4 A LOGICAL OBSCURITY
There is an obvious tension between the notion of a ‘force of inertia’ (I = −ma) and the
conception of force articulated in Newton’s first two laws. In the first law a body continues at
a constant velocity unless it is ‘compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon’,
and in the second law a force is responsible for ‘the alteration of motion’. However, with the
advent of the ‘force of inertia’ and the new equilibrium principle F +I = 0, forces are always
balanced and systems are always in equilibrium. More specifically, the force of inertia does
9It is worth noting, however, that d’Alembert’s principle retains certain advantages over other variational
principles. In particular, it can also accommodate forces which are not derivable from a scalar quantity.
10The class of forces that are derivable from a potential plays a prominent role in the treatment of a large
class of mechanical problems; cf. Sklar (2013) pp. 99-100.
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not compel a body to change its state of motion. From this perspective, the variational
tradition appears to be abandoning many of the core tenets of the Newtonian conception of
force.
A particularly clear way in which the vectorial and variational traditions diverge is on
the question of whether forces can depend on velocity. In the vectorial tradition there was a
clear rationale undergirding the expectation that all forces could ultimately be shown to be
independent of velocity (depending only on relative distance). However, in the variational
tradition constraint forces often clearly depend on velocity. The questionable nature of
velocity-dependent forces is particularly manifest against the backdrop of certain nineteenth
century attempts to treat mechanics as a unified fundamental theory.
In the period preceding Hertz’s work on Principles, there was a widely held view that
mechanics could be reduced to the actions of ‘elementary forces’ of a certain simple form.
In particular, such elementary forces were expected to depend only on the relative distance
between two objects and to act along a straight line connecting them (so-called ‘central’
forces). A key component of the attempt to reduce all of physics to mechanics was the idea
that all phenomena could be reduced to the actions of such simple forces between simple
objects. A clear illustration of the important role played by this idea is found in Helmholtz’s
seminal derivation of the ‘conservation of force’ (in modern terms: conservation of energy).
In his opening remarks, Helmholtz made the following striking claim:
The deduction of the propositions contained in the memoir may be based on either of two
maxims; either on the maxim that it is not possible by any combination whatever of natural
bodies to derive an unlimited amount of mechanical force, or on the assumption that all
actions in nature can be ultimately referred to attractive or repulsive forces, the intensity of
which depends solely upon the distances between the points by which the forces are exerted.
That both these [maxims] are identical is shown at the commencement of the memoir itself.
(Helmholtz, 1853, p. 114; emphasis added)
Thus Helmholtz attempted to prove that the conservation of energy was equivalent to the
claim that all fundamental forces were central forces which depended only on relative dis-
tance. Although Helmholtz’s proof is not satisfactory,11 what is important for present pur-
poses is that many physicists at this time were convinced that all forces could be reduced to
11Cf. Bevilacqua (1993) pp. 310 ff.
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such elementary forces. Indeed, Helmholtz was conveying a widely shared expectation (al-
beit with particular enthusiasm) with such pronouncements as the following: ‘[The vocation
of theoretical natural science] will be ended as soon as the reduction of natural phenomena
to simple forces is complete, and the proof given that this is the only reduction to which the
phenomena are capable’ (Helmholtz, 1853, p. 118).
However, consider the simple constrained system of a bead sliding without friction along
a rigid, curved wire.12 As the bead travels along the wire, reaction (or constraint) forces
will keep it on the trajectory determined by the wire’s shape. As these constraint forces
must perform no work, the resultant force on the bead that arises from the constraints
must always act perpendicularly to the bead’s instantaneous velocity. Thus relative to the
wire the bead maintains a constant generalized velocity, hence moving in accordance with
a principle of generalized inertia along this curved trajectory. In taking this approach we
have unhesitatingly separated the forces acting on the bead into the external (impressed)
forces and the internal (constraint) forces. However, the constraint forces must depend on
the bead’s velocity—if it slides faster, the reaction force bending its motion along the wire
has to increase accordingly (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Beads on wires
The immediate response at this juncture might be to argue that constraint forces are not
fundamental: at the microscopic scale, complex interactions are taking place, resulting in
small fluctuations in the bead’s velocity and even small distortions in the shape of the wire
12As noted, this is precisely the kind of problem that is particularly poorly suited to the vectorial approach,
and well suited to the variational.
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itself. (The assumption that the wire is perfectly rigid must be some kind of idealisation
after all.) The whole point of taking the variational approach to this problem was to avoid
the need to delve into such complexity, and only consider the dominant aspects of the bead’s
motion. However, all of this only further highlights that the constraint forces ubiquitous
in (and fundamental to) the variational approach are altogether quite different to vectorial
forces. Although it is often assumed that, if needed, one could reduce constraint forces
to underlying vectorial forces, no such “foundational” program has ever been successfully
carried out. As Wilson (2013) notes, attempts to construct macroscopic bodies starting with
atomic constituents runs into difficulties in specifying the special force laws which could make
an array of point-masses cohere into an extended body, rigid or otherwise. Furthermore,
going on to specify how such a body responds under impacts, for example, can be extremely
difficult, requiring modeling assumptions that plainly have ‘no relationship to any structure
present in real-life materials’ (Wilson, 2013, p. 68). Indeed, this fact shouldn’t be particularly
surprising—we have long since given up the expectation that interactions at atomic length
scales are governed by classical physics.
The upshot of the discussion so far can be summarised as follows. Newton’s first two
laws suggest that a force is a directed quantity, acting on an object and causing it to
accelerate. This is the intuitive idea of a force as a kind of push or pull. However, Newton’s
third law gestures at a somewhat different notion of force. According to this notion, forces
exist alongside the accelerated motions of objects, and comprise symmetric and synchronous
relations between them. This subtle ambiguity in the notion of force became more entrenched
as more sophisticated mechanical techniques were developed. In particular, d’Alembert’s
principle required the positing of a conceptually thorny ‘force of inertia’. The notion of
generalized force that is then recoverable within the variational techniques of Lagrange and
others is a high-dimensional vector that is tied to the degrees of freedom of the mechanical
system under consideration. Hence it is very unclear what the relationship is between this
notion of force and the original Newtonian notion of a kind of push or pull. Furthermore,
there is a potential contradiction lurking in the question of the velocity (in)dependence of
forces. The seemingly innocuous separation of constraint forces from impressed forces in
the formulation of the principle of virtual work becomes problematic following d’Alembert’s
53
extension of the principle to encompass systems in motion. In such cases the required
constraint forces are often clearly dependent on the system’s velocity. However, such velocity
dependence does not apply to any previous notion of force, and is explicitly disallowed in
traditional derivations of the conservation of energy.
I claim that these difficulties, engendered by the subtle variations in the meaning of the
term ‘force’, are in the background of Hertz’s concerns regarding the customary represen-
tation of mechanics. From this point of view it is a testament to Hertz’s insight that these
difficulties can be linked to the ambiguous notion of force in Newton’s original statement
of the laws of motion—that the ‘slight difference’ between Newton’s first two laws and the
third law ‘may be enough to produce the logical obscurity’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 6).
3.5 HERTZ’S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
In order to see how Hertz escapes such difficulties, let us now turn to consider the notion of
force that Hertz derives within his own framework. Recall that, for a system composed of n
material points, its associated configuration space will have 3n dimensions: one dimension
for each of the three position coordinates of each of its points. The points themselves will in
general have connections relating their relative positions. Hertz shows that such connections
can always be described by writing down equations of condition of a canonical form (cf.
§§125–128):
3n∑
ν=1
xινdxν = 0
Here, the xιν are continuous functions of the coordinates xν . If there are m connections be-
tween the points, then there will be m equations of condition (so that the index ι runs from
1 to m). To recap: each connection lowers the number of the system’s degrees of freedom
by one, and rules out a region of the system’s configuration space (i.e. the region which
corresponds to “breaking” that connection). Thus each connection defines a hypersurface of
(3n− 1) dimensions within the system’s full 3n-dimensional configuration space. The acces-
sible region of configuration space will have a total of 3n−m dimensions: the intersections
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of the hypersurfaces determined by the connections. Hertz’s fundamental law asserts that
the motion of a free system always traces out a straightest path on this curved hypersurface
embedded within its 3n-dimensional configuration space.
A more abstract and more powerful characterization of a system can be achieved by de-
scribing it in terms of its general coordinates. These coordinates can be used to characterize
a system directly in terms of its degrees of freedom. In particular, if general coordinates
are used to incorporate all the system’s connections, then the number of coordinates needed
is equal to system’s degrees of freedom.13 In that case a system with r (= 3n − m) de-
grees of freedom has r general coordinates, p1, ..., pr. Hertz introduces the notion of general
coordinates as follows:
We may also consider the system as determined by means of any r quantities p1..pρ..pr
whatever, as long as we agree to associate continuously a given value-system of these
coordinates with a given position of the system, and conversely. The rectangular coordinates
are therefore functions of these quantities, and conversely. The quantities pρ are called the
general coordinates of the system. (§13)
In general, the 3n Cartesian coordinates of a system can be expressed as functions of r
general coordinates:
x1 = f1(p1, ..., pr) . . . z3n = f3n(p1, ..., pr)
The use of such coordinates is particularly important in Hertz’s framework because of the
primary role played by connections, i.e. conditions that give rise to constraints.14 For a simple
example of the usefulness of general coordinates in this context, consider a dumbbell system:
two masses with a single rigid connection between them. If the locations of the two masses are
given by the ordinary Cartesian coordinates (x1, y1, z1) and (x2, y2, z2) respectively, then the
representative point in configuration space can be given by using all six of these coordinates
(Figure 3.5).
Note that if we removed the rigid connection, the six position coordinates would all be
independent—any one of them could change without affecting the others. In that case the
13If the general coordinates incorporate only a proper subset of the system’s connections, then the number
of the system’s degrees of freedom is less than r.
14For Hertz’s definition of constraint in terms of a system’s connections, see §385.
55
Figure 3.5: Configuration space 1
system would have six degrees of freedom: every point in the six-dimensional configuration
space would then represent a possible configuration of the system. However, the presence
of the rigid connection prevents the coordinates from being entirely independent of each
other, and hence many points in configuration space represent impossible configurations
(they would represent the rigid connection being broken). The connection thus determines
a ‘surface’ of possible configurations, and motions of the system are represented by paths
along this surface (Figure 3.6).
In fact, the existence of the connection results in this system having only five degrees of
freedom: once we have specified any five of the coordinates, the remaining sixth coordinate
is thereby determined. Rather than arbitrarily designate one coordinate as dependent on the
other five, we can instead use three position coordinates to determine the system’s center
of mass, (X, Y, Z), and two angles to determine its orientation (θ, φ). Note that these five
quantities can vary independently of each other (Figure 3.7).
Hence X, Y, Z, θ, and φ provide a set of specially adapted general coordinates for this
system, mirroring its five degrees of freedom. The use of such coordinates leads to a particu-
larly elegant characterization of a system’s configuration space: the coordinates characterise
a curved (Riemannian) space with the same number of dimensions as the system’s degrees
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Figure 3.6: Configuration space 2
of freedom. By using these coordinates we arrive immediately at the relevant “surface” of
possible motions—the embedding space of impossible motions has disappeared from view
(Figure 3.8). Characterizing a system in terms of its general coordinates gives rise to a more
abstract characterization of a system’s configuration space: the pρ are curvilinear coordinates
of an r-dimensional Riemannian space.15 Characterizing configuration space in terms of a
system’s general coordinates still preserves the elegance of the fundamental law—the motion
of a free system still traces out a ‘straightest path’.
3.5.1 ‘Systems acted on by forces’
Recall that, from Hertz’s perspective, any apparently unfree system is partial, encompassed
within a ‘complete’ system which is itself free (cf. §429). The cases of particular interest,
unsurprisingly, are those in which the partial system is the only part of a complete system
that is observable: ‘When a part of a free system is considered an unfree system it is assumed
that the rest of the system is more or less unknown, so that an immediate application of the
fundamental law is impossible’ (§430).
15The expression for the metric structure of this Riemannian space is reproduced in Appendix A.
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Figure 3.7: General coordinates
Hertz considers two classes of partial systems: guided systems and systems acted on by
forces. In the latter case, two (or more) material systems form a combined system by having
at least one coordinate in common. Such systems are thereby ‘coupled’ to one another (cf.
§450). It is here, then, that we find Hertz’s reintroduction of the notion of force: ‘By a force
we understand the independently conceived effect which one of two coupled systems, as a
consequence of the fundamental law, exerts upon the motion of the other’ (§455).
Let the r coordinates pρ and the r coordinates pρ describe two coupled systems, A and
B, respectively, and let us arrange the indices so that the common coordinates in both
systems have the same index. Hence the fact that the systems are coupled is expressed via
the condition that, for at least one value of ρ:
pρ − pρ = 0
This immediately gives:
dpρ − dpρ = 0
Each of the coupled systems has its own equations of condition. In general coordinates, these
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Figure 3.8: Configuration space 3
are expressed as follows:16
r∑
ρ=1
pχρdpρ = 0
r∑
ρ=1
pχρdpρ = 0
We want to derive an expression for the effect that one coupled system has upon the
other, and hence the force (as Hertz defines that term) that it exerts. Let us consider
the force that the system B exerts on the system A.17 For the uncoupled coordinates, the
equations of motion of the system have the following form:18
mfρ +
k∑
χ=1
pχρPχ = 0
Here, fρ is a generalized acceleration vector, defined as the rate of change of the system’s
velocity (cf. §273). The pχρ are the same factors that appear in the system’s equations of
condition, whilst the Pχ incorporate information about the curvature of the system’s path.
16Where before we had introduced xιν as continuous functions of the Cartesian coordinates, here the pχρ
are continuous functions of the general coordinates.
17We could, of course, equally well consider the effect that the system A has on the system B. As Hertz
stresses, which of these effects should be called the ‘force’ and which the ‘counterforce’ is perfectly arbitrary,
cf. §456.
18The reader interested in technical details is directed to Appendix B.
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The only difference for the coupled coordinates turns out to be that we need to include
an extra factor, Pρ, in these equations (cf. §457):
mfρ +
k∑
χ=1
pχρPχ − Pρ = 0
By setting Pρ = 0 for all values of ρ that are not coupled coordinates, the above equations
can be used as a more general expression for the equations of motion for the system (cf.
§459). Thus the quantities Pρ ‘forms the analytical expression for the force which the system
pρ exerts on the system pρ’ (§460). Indeed: ‘By this determination we place ourselves in
agreement with the existing notation of mechanics; and the necessity for securing such an
agreement sufficiently justifies us in choosing this particular determination out of several
permissible ones’ (§460).
3.6 HERTZ’S NOTION OF FORCE
Hertz’s notion of force adds nothing beyond the application of the fundamental law to a
system of connected material points. Even so, Hertz is able to show that his notion is in
accord with the notion of force in the customary representation of mechanics to a remarkable
degree.
Most immediately, Hertz’s forces are vector quantities, both with regard to the systems
that exert them and with regard to the systems that they are exerted on. All the expected
compositional properties of forces are thus recovered: multiple forces can be added together
to form a resultant force, and a single force can be analysed into components (cf. §§461
ff.). Hertz also points out that various different systems can exert the same force on a given
system, and also that one given system can exert the same force on various different systems.
Hence a force itself (considered simply as a certain vector quantity) can be considered on its
own terms, independently of the partial system that is, so to speak, responsible for it (§§464
f.).
Hertz also derives sharpened up versions of Newton’s three laws of motion, making ex-
plicit that the clearest and least ambiguous applications of the laws are to systems consisting
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of a single point. Regarding the first law, Hertz first observes that a free system with no
connections ‘persists in its condition of rest or uniform motion in a straight path’ (§382).
As we have already seen, this is just because in such cases the straight path in physical
space is at the same time the straightest path in configuration space. Hertz then notes that
Newton’s first law follows as a corollary of this fact concerning connection-free systems in
general, because it will obviously apply to a system consisting of just one material point:
A free material point persists in its condition of rest or uniform motion in a straight path
(Galileo’s Law of Inertia or Newton’s First Law). (§383)
Regarding the second law, Hertz similarly shows that if a system with no connections
accelerates (i.e. by being coupled with another system, hence having a force exerted on it),
then that acceleration ‘takes place in the direction of the force which acts on the system,
and its magnitude is equal to the magnitude of the force, divided by the mass of the system’
(§494). What this motion will look like will of course depend entirely on the force in question
(i.e. how this connection-free system is coupled to some other system). However, in the
limiting case where the system we are considering consists of just one material point, its
acceleration can always be given by an ordinary three-dimensional vector. Hence Hertz takes
the case of a single point—again as the limiting case of a system without connections—as
corresponding to a statement of Newton’s second law:
The acceleration of a single material point takes place in the direction of the force acting
on it, and its magnitude is equal to the magnitude of the force, divided by the mass of the
point (Newton’s second law). (§495)
The case of the third law is more subtle: Hertz derives an action-reaction principle that
has a close relationship with Newton’s third law but is not equivalent to it (even for a single
point). Earlier, we defined the vector Pρ as the force which the system B exerts on the
system A. This is a vector quantity with regard to system A because it gives the components
of the force along the coordinates pρ. If we wish to regard this force as a vector quantity
with regard to system B, it’s components along pρ can be denoted P
′
ρ. Similarly, we can
consider the “counterforce” that the system A exerts on the system B. The components of
this force along the coordinates of system B are then denoted by Pρ, and, as before, if we
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consider this force as a vector quantity with regard to system A, this is denoted by P ′ρ. Hertz
then shows (§467) that:
Pρ = −Pρ19
However, Hertz is careful to delineate this result from Newton’s third law. The key difference
lies in the fact that Newton’s action-reaction principle, unlike Hertz’s, is intended to apply
to actions-at-a-distance:
Newton’s Law, as he intended it to be understood, contains our proposition completely;
this is shown by the examples appended to his statement of the law. But Newton’s Law
contains more. At least it is usually applied to actions-at-a-distance, i.e. to forces between
bodies which have no common coordinates. But our mechanics does not recognise such
actions. (§469)
Hertz further observes that where Newton’s action-reaction principle deviates from his
own is precisely where it is open to criticism and doubt. Firstly, as we saw in section three,
unless the two bodies are point-masses the line connecting them (along which the two forces
are supposed to be equal and opposite) is open to ambiguity.20 Secondly, as experimental
results had been starting to confirm in Hertz’s lifetime, the third law may simply be false
when applied to electromagnetic interactions between distant bodies:
...the application of the principle of reaction to actions-at-a-distance commonly found in
mechanics manifestly represents an experiential fact, concerning the correctness of which
in all cases people are beginning to be doubtful. For instance, in Electromagnetics we are
almost convinced that the mutual action between moving magnets is not in all cases strictly
subject to the principle. (§470)
Most importantly for present purposes, Hertz’s framework offers a thorough clarification
of the relationship between vectorial and variational forces. In line with his re-statement of
Newton’s laws of motion, Hertz identifies the vectorial notion of force with the force on a
single point. This is the class of Hertzian forces which are represented by ordinary three-
dimensional vectors. He calls these forces ‘Newtonian’ or elementary forces. Thus Hertz
19Or, equivalently: P ′ρ = −Pρ′. Hence Pρ = −P ′ρ, Pρ = −Pρ′.
20In Hertz’s words: ‘when force and counter-force affect different bodies, it is not quite clear what is meant
by opposite’ (§470).
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recovers a picture of ‘elementary mechanics’: Newtonian forces acting on point-masses. In
contrast, Hertz calls the more general (higher-dimensional) force-vectors ‘Lagrangian’:
As a rule, elementary mechanics means by forces only elementary forces. By way of distinc-
tion, the more general forms of forces hitherto considered by us are denoted as Lagrangian
forces. Similarly we might denote the elementary forces as Galilean or Newtonian forces.
(§476)
The fact that every system can be conceived as composed of material point in three-
dimensional Euclidean space means that every Lagrangian force can be conceived as de-
composable into elementary Newtonian forces (§479). In most cases, no useful such de-
composition can be given, and in any case such a decomposition would be highly arbitrary.
Nevertheless, from the perspective provided by Hertz’s framework, the relationship between
general and ‘elementary’ forces is unproblematic.
Concerning the question of the velocity (in)dependence of forces, it is important to
keep in mind that within Hertz’s framework, at base there is always nothing more than an
application of the fundamental law to a free system of connected material points.21 Because
Hertz treats connections as fundamental he derives forces from constraints rather than the
other way around. One result of this is that the distinction between ‘constraint forces’
and ‘impressed forces’ does not arise in a problematic way. Indeed, although the idea of
an impressed force is more familiar, from Hertz’s perspective this notion is employed in
situations in which we are particularly ignorant; situations in which we characterize the
motion of the (partial) system in question with the limited information that we have.
In summary, Hertz’s notion of force is introduced as a way to succinctly capture the
effect that one system can have on another (in particular, when the two are coupled together
to form a combined system). In the general case, this is best represented by the high-
dimensional ‘Lagrangian’ vector that is tied directly to the system’s degrees of freedom.
Derivatively, we can recover the three-dimensional vectors in ordinary space that correspond
to more familiar ‘Netwonian’ forces, either on the points making up a complex system, or
on a single isolated point on its own. And from this perspective we can see that, if a partial
system is all that is observable, a force is what appears to be the most immediate cause of
21Furthermore, conservation of energy is derived as an immediate consequence of the fundamental law
itself, cf. §§340 ff.
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its acceleration. In an important sense, then, Hertz’s approach reverses the direction of the
historical development of mechanics.
As we will see, the way in which Hertz avoided the logical obscurity surrounding the
Newtonian notion of force had a lasting impact on Wittgenstein’s conception of the ambitions
of philosophy.
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4.0 MODELS AND MULTIPLICITIES
‘As I have often said, philosophy does not lead me to any renunciation, since I do not abstain
from saying something, but rather abandon a certain combination of words as senseless.
In another sense, however, philosophy requires a resignation, but one of feeling and not of
intellect. And maybe that is what makes it so difficult for many. It can be difficult not to
use an expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears or an outburst of anger.’
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript, §86
4.1 FUNDAMENTAL CONFUSIONS
In cases where a single term is used to perform subtly different functions, there may be
competing demands on the term that cannot be met in a consistent way. If we fail to notice
how this situation has arisen, we may misdiagnose what has gone wrong when these demands
come into conflict. We may even attempt to introduce additional demands to those that are
already present. However, the correct response would be to reduce the number of demands,
or otherwise avoid the existing demands coming into conflict.
This kind of response is articulated clearly by Hertz in his diagnosis of the confusion
surrounding the term ‘force’. In justifying the need for a reformulation of classical mechanics,
Hertz diagnoses the persistent puzzlement over the nature of force in the following way:
With the terms ‘velocity’ and ‘gold’ we connect a large number of relations to other terms;
and between all these relations we find no contradictions which offend us. We are therefore
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satisfied and ask no further questions. But we have accumulated around the [term] ‘force’...
more relations than can be completely reconciled amongst themselves. We have an obscure
feeling of this and want to have things cleared up. Our confused wish finds expression in
the confused question as to the nature of force... But the answer which we want is not
really an answer to this question. It is not by finding out more and fresh relations and
connections that it can be answered; but by removing the contradictions existing between
those already known, and thus perhaps by reducing their number. (Hertz, 1899, pp. 7-8)
Hertz is here claiming that the relations between ‘force’ and other terms have accumulated in
such a way that they cannot be ‘completely reconciled amongst themselves’. The discussion
of the last chapter allows us to give a more precise characterization of this issue. The
accumulation of conflicting relations around the term ‘force’ arises because it does not have
a unitary meaning. In particular, the notion of an impressed force is not entirely consonant
with the notion of a constraint force. The issue underlying Hertz’s concern, then, is that the
word ‘force’ is being used in mechanics in two subtly different ways.1
The source of confusion that Hertz’s concern traces back to—the fact that a given
term can be put to multiple uses; uses that might come into conflict, or even be strictly
incompatible—generalises well beyond classical mechanics. In particular, such a source of
confusion is a matter of central concern in the Tractatus :
3.323 In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different
modes of signification—and so belongs to different symbols—or that two words that have
different modes of signification are employed in sentences in what is superficially the same
way.
Thus the word ‘is’ figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for
existence; ‘exist’ figures as an intransitive verb like ‘go’, and ‘identical’ as an adjective; we
speak of something, but also of something’s happening.
For Wittgenstein, the fact that the varying uses of words can be masked by the superficial
ways they occur in colloquial sentences is an acute philosophical danger. At 3.324 he writes:
‘In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy
is full of them).’
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the passage from Hertz’s introduction quoted
above resonated deeply with Wittgenstein, who even went so far as to suggest that it summed
1Indeed, Hertz explicitly suggests that an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘force’ may be at the root of his
concerns: ‘The notion of force in [Newton’s third law], and the conception which [Newton’s] first two laws
presume and suggest to us, seem to me to be slightly different, and this slight difference may be enough to
produce the logical obscurity...’ (Hertz, 1899, p. 6).
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up philosophy.2 In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein makes two specific references to Principles,
one to Hertz’s notion of dynamical models (at 4.04) and one to Hertz’s notion of connec-
tions (at 6.361).3 A central claim of the Tractatus is that ordinary sentences are analysable
as truth-functions of elementary sentences, sentences which refer to simple objects. In-
terpretations of the Tractatus—particularly interpretations of the significance of this cen-
tral claim—can be divided into two broad camps: ontologically-oriented interpretations and
logically-oriented interpretations.4
On an ontologically-oriented interpretation, simple objects play a primary role: it is the
existence of simple objects which imbues the names in elementary sentences with meaning,
and the sense of colloquial sentences is then explained by appealing to the sense of elementary
sentences. On a logically-oriented interpretation, however, the sense of colloquial sentences is
not regarded as something that requires explanation, and simple objects do not play a special
explanatory role. This central contrast can be summed up in the following way: according
to an ontologically-oriented interpretation, the Tractatus takes a bottom-up approach to the
analysis of colloquial sentences, whereas according to logically-oriented interpretation, the
Tractatus takes a top-down approach.5 To flesh this out in some more detail, it will be
helpful to draw a comparison with the similarly contrasting approaches to analysis taken by
Russell and by Frege.
During his ‘logical atomism’ period,6 Russell works within an epistemological framework
which privileges the notion of acquaintance. Russell describes this as a direct and unmedi-
ated relation between a subject and an object: ‘I say that I am acquainted with an object
when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the
2Cf. McGuinness (2002a), ix and Kjærgaard (2002), pp. 125-126. See also Wittgenstein (2005), p. 310e:
‘As I do philosophy, its entire task is to shape expression in such a way that certain worries disappear.
((Hertz.))’
3In what follows I will only be concerned with Wittgenstein’s first reference to Principles. I intend to
turn to Wittgenstein’s second reference to Principles in future work.
4Proponents of an ontologically-oriented interpretation of the Tractatus include Black (1964), Griffin
(1964), Hacker (1986), and Pears (1987). Proponents of a logically-oriented interpretation include Ishiguro
(1969), Rhees (1970), Diamond (1988), Kremer (1997), McGuinness (2002b), Goldfarb (2011), and Ricketts
(2014). For a similar division of interpretations of the Tractatus into two broad camps, see Kremer (1997)
pp. 107-108.
5Note that my deployment of the expressions ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ is not exactly the same as that
of other commentators, such as Kremer (1997) and Ricketts (2014), though it is closely related.
6I have in mind Russell’s 1918 lectures, ‘The philosophy of logical atomism’ (Russell, 1919/2009), and
the various earlier texts that feed into this work.
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object itself’ (Russell, 1910, p. 108). Examples of objects known by acquaintance include
logical forms, universals, and sense-data. For Russell, it is impossible for an object to bear
a logically proper name unless that object is known by acquaintance; hence an important
achievement of analysis is to show that colloquial names are not names in this sense (rather,
they are typically disguised definite descriptions). On Russell’s view, the analysis of col-
loquial sentences terminates at the level of ‘atomic’ sentences, and the names that appear
there will only be logically proper names. Acquaintance with objects imbues these names
with meaning, and our ability to understand colloquial sentence stems, ultimately, from our
knowledge of objects with which we are acquainted.7 The last stage of analysis thus plays a
primary role: it is acquaintance with objects which imbues the symbols in atomic sentences
with meaning, and the meaningfulness of atomic sentences then ‘flows upwards’ to colloquial
sentences. In this sense, then, Russell’s approach to analysis is bottom-up
Characterised in this way, Russell’s approach contrasts sharply with Frege’s. Whereas
Russell treats the simple symbols for items known by acquaintance as playing a primary
role, and the meaningfulness of colloquial sentences as derived from them, Frege regards the
constituents of a colloquial sentence as significant only via the examination of the sentence
as a whole. As Thomas Ricketts has argued, this stems from the primacy Frege attributes
to judgement.8 The whole sentence—or, rather, the whole proposition: the sentence that
expresses something that can be judged true or false—then becomes the primary unit of
semantics. Indeed, Frege regards the privileging of whole judgements (hence whole proposi-
tions) as distinctive of his approach to logic:
For in Aristotle, as in Boole, the logically primitive activity is the formation of concepts by
abstraction... As opposed to this, I start from judgments and their contents, and not from
concepts. (Frege, 1979, pp. 15-16)
On Frege’s approach, it is the fact that our propositions express judgements that are
true or false, and that we infer from certain propositions to others, that lends significance
to the parts of our propositions—hence to notions like concept and object. Frege emphasises
this approach to the analysis of sentences throughout his career. As early as 1880 he writes,
7Cf. Russell (1910), p. 117: ‘Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of
constituents with which we are acquainted ’ (emphasis in original).
8Cf. Ricketts (1986), particularly pp. 313-321.
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‘instead of putting a judgment together out of an individual as subject and already previously
formed concept as predicate, we do the opposite and arrive at a concept by splitting up the
content of possible judgment’ (Frege, 1979, p. 253), and as late as 1919 he writes, ‘I do not
begin with concepts and put them together to form a thought or a judgment; I come by
the parts of a thought by analyzing a thought’ (Frege, 1979, p. 17).9 Frege’s approach to
analysis is thus top-down: the first stage of analysis plays a primary role. The significance
of the symbols appearing in analysed sentences stems from the significance of the symbols
in the original colloquial sentences, not the other way around. Indeed, the significance of
colloquial sentences is not explained in terms of anything else; it is presupposed.
To sum up: on Russell’s bottom-up approach, the termination of analysis at the level of
atomic sentences is what imbues colloquial sentences with the significance that they have.
It is our acquaintance with objects that gives the symbols in atomic sentences meaning,
and in this way our ability to understand colloquial sentences is accounted for. On Frege’s
top-down approach, however, our ability to understand colloquial sentences is not a tar-
get explanandum. Rather, our evident ability to understand (and draw inferences from)
colloquial sentences is itself what lends significance to the analysands of those sentences.
I can now flesh out my suggestion that an ontologically-oriented interpretation of the
Tractatus carries with it a bottom-up approach to analysis, whereas a logically-oriented
interpretation carries with it a top-down approach. Beginning with the former: on an
ontologically-oriented interpretation, the argument for the existence of simple objects begins
with a conception of naming that has clear similarities to Russell’s. On that conception,
if an object did not exist then its name, absent a referent, would be meaningless. As the
objects that we encounter in day-to-day life exist contingently, this implies that names of
ordinary objects have their meanings contingently. In particular, the meaningfulness of
a name depends on the component parts of the relevant object being arranged so as to
constitute that object. Hence the sense of sentences in which such names occur seems to
depend on the truth of further sentences—sentences describing the constitution of the named
objects. Borrowing an example from the Philosophical Investigations, David Pears puts this
9For a summary of some of the arguments and textual evidence in favour of this interpretation of Frege,
see Goldfarb (2002) p. 190.
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point in the following way: ‘[this] seems to make the sense of ‘The broom is in the corner’
depend on the truth of ‘The brush is attached to the broomstick’.’ (Pears, 1987, p. 77)10
Here a regress threatens: the component parts of an object that we pick out will typically
have component parts themselves; thus the meanings of the names of these component parts
will depend on the truth of yet further sentences. If this analysis into smaller and smaller
components is not to go on forever, it must terminate on ontological simples—objects that
have no internal structure at all. The meaningfulness of the names of such objects would
then no longer depend on the truth of any further sentences. Having dived down to such
depths, one could return to colloquial language reassured that it was firmly anchored in
elementary sentences; sentences which referred to simple objects. The Tractatus is thus seen
to expound a metaphysics of simple entities—one that bears a limited comparison with a
Russellian metaphysics—and it is via its connection with the elements of this metaphysics
that language finds its purchase on the world.
An ontologically-oriented interpretation thus carries with it a bottom-up conception of
analysis: the last stage of analysis—elementary sentences consisting of names of simple
objects—plays a primary role. Simple objects imbue the names in elementary sentences
with meaning, and the sense of colloquial sentences is then accounted for by appealing to
the sense of elementary sentences. This is the ontologically-oriented understanding of simple
objects defended by Peter Hacker:
The simple objects are, Wittgenstein thought, the final residue of analysis, the indecompos-
able elements that are the meanings of the unanalysable names that occur in elementary
propositions. He knew, so he thought, that there must be such things. There must be
unanalysable objects if language is to be related to the world... For only thus can the need
for a firm anchor for language be met. (Hacker, 1986, pp. 65-66)
What alternative does a logically-oriented interpretation of the Tractatus provide? This
will emerge more fully as the argument of this chapter progresses; here, I limit myself to a
brief summary. On a logically-oriented interpretation, the notion of a simple object only finds
its significance given the application and use of language, and the claim that such objects
exist does not add anything beyond the claim that sentences have sense; that sentences
10Cf. Wittgenstein (1953) §60.
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represent or picture states of affairs. This is the kind of logically-oriented understanding of
simple objects defended by Brian McGuinness:
...we must not think of the realm of reference as a mysterious, infinitely extended magazine
of things, as if they were concrete objects, with which we might or might not be lucky
enough in a full life to have acquaintance by, so to speak, coming across them in a street.
There is already contained in language and thought the possibility of all objects that are
possible. (McGuinness, 2002c, p. 91)
On this view, the central motivation to appeal to the logical apparatus of the Tractatus—
including the notion of a simple object—is to display the logical relationships among collo-
quial sentences. A logically-oriented interpretation carries with it a top-down conception of
analysis in the sense that the first stage of analysis—ordinary colloquial sentences and their
manifest logical relationships—plays a primary role. In particular, the sense of elementary
sentences stems from the sense of the original colloquial sentences, not the other way around.
Despite the fact that these interpretations present radically divergent ways of reading
the Tractatus, it seems difficult to resolve this issue on purely textual grounds.11 However,
my central contention in what follows is that Wittgenstein’s reference to Hertz’s dynamical
models at 4.04 is a striking piece of textual evidence in favour of a logically-oriented in-
terpretation. More specifically, I will argue that Hertz’s analysis of mechanical systems in
Principles can be recognised as a precedent for a logically-oriented construal of Tractarian
analysis, and that the recognition of Hertz’s influence in this regard provides a distinctive
conception of what the termination of Tractarian analysis might look like.
4.2 LOGICAL PICTURES
When Wittgenstein refers to Principles at 4.04 in the Tractatus, he indicates that Hertz’s
dynamical models are particularly helpful in bringing out what it means for a sentence to
have the same ‘logical (mathematical) multiplicity’ as what it represents:
11The purely textual defense of either interpretation can be bulwarked by appealing to sources besides the
Tractatus itself—cf. Kremer (1997) p. 109.
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4.04 In a sentence there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as there are in the
situation that it represents.
The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity. (Compare Hertz’s
Mechanics on dynamical models.)
The series of remarks in the 4.0s is the second and final time that the word ‘picture’
(Bild) features in the Tractatus in a sustained and prominent way. The first time is in
the series of remarks in the 2.1s and 2.2s, where Wittgenstein articulates the Tractarian
conception of picturing in general. The 4.0s then apply this conception of picturing to
sentences. Wittgenstein’s description of sentences as pictures is not figurative—he insists
that a written sentence proves to be a picture ‘even in the ordinary sense’ (4.011). At 4.012
we are given an indication of how this might work: in a sentence of the form ‘aRb’—which
says that a stands to b in the relation R—the propositional sign itself looks like two things of
a certain kind, ‘a’ and ‘b’, related to each other by the fact that ‘R’ stands between them.12
But it is apparent that a sentence-sign like ‘aRb’ is the exception rather than the rule: most
declarative sentences don’t look anything like the situations they assert to obtain. Although
Wittgenstein repeatedly suggests that the operative conception of picturing in the Tractatus
is, in certain central ways, a familiar one, it is difficult to see how ordinary sentences could
possibly be pictures in a familiar sense. Our first task will be to address this puzzle.
In the 2.1s, we are told that the elements of a picture correspond to objects (2.13), and
that what constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate
way (2.14). Following this, the notion of pictorial form is introduced:
2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate
way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connection of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call
the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.
Pictorial form is ‘the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way
as the elements of the picture’ (2.151). This is readily applicable to familiar pictures: the
spatial relations in a spatial picture, or the relations among colours in a coloured picture,
mirror the corresponding relations among the depicted objects. Hence a diagram showing
a spatial arrangement of items could have been drawn with the items in different positions,
12This example is also discussed earlier, at 3.1432.
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for example, or a painting showing the colours of certain flowers could have been made using
a different palette. These latent possibilities are a reflection of the possibilities that apply
to the depicted objects themselves.13 According to the Tractatus, it is pictorial form which
imbues the correlations between the elements of a picture and the associated objects with
the significance that they have (cf. 2.151-2.1514); a picture is a picture in virtue of the
pictorial form that it shares with what it represents (2.16, 2.17).
To illustrate the notion of pictorial form further, imagine that I want to represent the
order in which a truck, car, and taxi are parked outside my house by arranging a cup,
book, and pen in a line on my desk.14 Such a physical model is a particularly direct way of
representing a spatial fact—the model can employ exactly the same kind of relations among
its elements as the spatial arrangement of objects it depicts because, of course, the model
is itself a spatial arrangement of objects. To simplify the example further, imagine that the
only fact that I intend to represent is the mere linear ordering of the vehicles—i.e. which
one is between the other two—rather than any further facts about their relative locations
(which one is furthest to the left, how close together they are, and so on). The pictorial form
that allows the items on my desk to represent the order in which the vehicles are parked
can be seen in the possibility of arranging them accordingly once I have determined which
item is correlated with which vehicle. Hence these two facts—the ordering of the items on
my desk and the ordering of the vehicles outside—have the same pictorial form, and the one
can represent the other.
So conceived, the same pictorial form can be easily manifested in more abstract repre-
sentations. All that is required is that the possibilities of the relations among the elements
of the representation is the same as the possibilities of the relations among the represented
objects. For example, rather than arranging the items on my desk in a line I could instead
place a coin on one of them to indicate that it is ‘between’ the other two. In this case it
13Cf. 2.0131: ‘A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument-place.)
A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded
by colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the touch some degree of hardness, and so on.’ See
also 2.031-2.033.
14A more complicated example is the model of the car accident used in a Paris courtroom that Wittgenstein
took as inspiration, cf. Wittgenstein (1998), p. 7. Note that it is reasonable to treat ‘model’ (Modell) and
‘picture’ (Bild) as synonyms in the context of the Tractatus; cf. 2.12 and 4.01. For some discussion of the
connotations of ‘Bild ’ in this regard, see Rhees (1970), p. 4.
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is the presence of the coin rather than the items’ spatial arrangement that represents the
ordering of the vehicles. That too would provide a picture of the vehicles by dint of having
the same pictorial form; the same possibilities of relations among the elements of the model.
(The coin could be placed on any of the items on my desk, thus mirroring the possibility
that any of the vehicles is the one parked between the other two.) Beyond this, the same
pictorial form could re-emerge in a great variety of abstract representations: in symbols on a
piece of paper, in a series of sounds, in a certain pattern of wiggling of my eyebrows, and so
on. All that is required is the possibility that the elements of the representation are related
to one another in the same way as the depicted objects.
It might be objected that the items on my desk, let alone the elements of more abstract
representations, manifestly do not have the same possibilities of relations as the vehicles
they are representing. Many of the ways that I might manipulate the cup, book, and pen
have nothing obvious corresponding to them concerning the parked vehicles outside: I might
drop the pen on the floor or take the lid off and throw it away, for example. In response to
this objection, note that in using the items on my desk as a model of the parked vehicles
I must stipulate what features of the items are representationally significant. Until I have
said otherwise, the colour or shape or size of the items does not represent anything at all.
In the case where I arrange them in a line, the items on my desk only provide a model of
the parked vehicles insofar as one of them is situated determinately between the other two,
and dropping the pen on the floor is as representationally inert as the material the pen is
made of. Of course, the way in which I am using these items as a model can be varied. Say
I wanted to enhance my model by using a colour code to represent which of the vehicles (if
any) has been left unlocked. The items I originally chose might suit the purpose already if,
for instance, the pen is red whilst the book and cup both happen to be blue, and if only
the taxi is unlocked. In that case I can simply declare that red means unlocked, blue means
locked, and that the pen (suitably placed) corresponds to the taxi. However, enhancing the
model in this way clearly carries with it the possibility of using another red item (say, a book
with a red cover) to represent the possibility that one of the other vehicles is also unlocked.
The possibilities of the relations among the elements in my model now includes a binary
colour scheme as well as a linear ordering, and in this way my model stands to represent
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the locked or unlocked states of the vehicles as well as the order in which they are parked.
Hence the pictorial form shared by the model and the situations it stands to depict is now
different to what it was before.
Let this stand as a proposed interpretation of 2.12–2.17. To recap: in a picture, the
elements of the picture correspond to objects (2.13) and the fact that the pictorial elements
are related to one another in a determinate way represents that the depicted objects are
related to one another in a determinate way (2.15). Pictorial form is the possibility that
the elements of the picture are related to one another in the same way as the things that
those elements depict (2.151). Pictorial form is therefore identical in a picture and the fact
depicted (2.16), and it is through its pictorial form that a picture is a picture (2.161, 2.17).
The notion of pictorial form thus plays a particularly central role: ‘That is how a picture is
attached to reality; it reaches right out to it’ (2.1511).
Let us turn to consider how this conception of picturing can be applied to sentences. The
claim at 4.01 that a sentence is a picture is justified at 4.02 with the seemingly unrelated
observation that ‘we can understand the sense of a sentence-sign without its having been
explained to us’. Wittgenstein elaborates on this by noting that, although the meaning of
an unfamiliar word needs to be explained, the meaning of an unfamiliar sentence is readily
comprehensible (4.026); a sentence is typically understood by anyone who understands its
constituents (4.024). This leads naturally into 4.03: ‘A sentence must use old expressions to
communicate a new sense.’ But what has all this got to do with the idea that a sentence is
a picture?
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the construction of unfamiliar sentences from familiar words
becomes intelligible with the central role of pictorial form in view. Roughly, it is the possi-
bilities of the relations among the elements of a sentence (the words) which can mirror the
possibilities of the relations among the elements of the represented situation. Here, then, is
how a sentence is a picture. Returning to the example of the vehicles parked outside my
house, I can describe the relative positions of the vehicles just as I can describe the ordering
of the items on my desk. By dint of the fact that they can represent the linear ordering
of three individuals, those sentences then have the same pictorial form as the fact that the
vehicles in the street (or the items on my desk) are arranged in a particular order. Thus I can
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describe the arrangement of the vehicles by saying: “the car is parked between the truck and
the taxi”.15 In this sentence, the pictorial form that it shares with the situation it depicts
can be seen in the possibility of rearranging the sentential elements—the words—as required.
Hence permuting the words ‘car’ and ‘truck’ to form a new sentence is like switching around
the cup and the book on my desk.16
Pictorial form thus provides a central bridge between the 2.1s and the 4.0s. If a sentence
is to be a picture of reality (4.01), then what it must have in common with reality, in order
to be able to depict it in the way it does, is its pictorial form (2.17). This is how sentences
prove to be pictures ‘even in the ordinary sense’. Note, however, that it is specifically a
logical picture that is mentioned at 4.03:
4.03 A sentence must use old expressions to communicate a new sense.
A sentence communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected
with the situation.
And the connection is precisely that it is its logical picture
A sentence states something only in so far as it is a picture.
The notion of a logical picture is introduced in the concluding remarks of the 2.1s:
2.18 What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be
able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form
of reality.
2.181 A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture.
2.182 Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, not every picture
is, for example, a spatial one.)
2.19 Logical pictures can depict the world.
Logical form is common to all pictures which can depict reality ‘correctly or incorrectly’.
Given any two possible situations, the obtaining or non-obtaining of one will either guaran-
tee the obtaining or non-obtaining of the other, or vice versa, or else they will be independent.
Thus: the correctness or incorrectness of one picture will imply the correctness or incorrect-
ness of a second picture, or vice versa, or else they will be independent. Because every picture
(that can depict reality correctly or incorrectly) sits in its logical relationships with other
15Here, obviously enough, the words ‘truck’, ‘car’ and ‘taxi’ each goes proxy for the relevant vehicle, while
‘x is parked between y and z’ conveys their linear ordering.
16I will not consider issues concerning truth-functionally complex sentences here. For some discussion, see
Ricketts (1996) §IV.
76
such pictures, every picture is a logical picture. One reason why the notion of logical picture
is mentioned at 4.03 is because the sentences of natural language can adopt a multitude of
pictorial forms. I can describe a spatial arrangement of objects (“the book is between the
coffee cup and the pen”) or a pattern of colours (“the flowers are pink, blue, and crimson”),
and many other situations besides. In all cases, however, these sentences are still logical
pictures of what they represent: ‘every picture is at the same time a logical one’.
In the discussion of picturing so far, there has been no need to depart from straightfor-
ward and familiar examples, examples in which the depicted objects are just ordinary things
like pens, flowers, and taxis. However, immediately preceding the discussion of picturing in
the 2.1s is the grand metaphysics of the 2.0s: the states of affairs that are configurations
of simple objects ; objects which themselves make up ‘the substance of the world’ (2.021).
Although many of these remarks about configurations of objects in states of affairs are
straightforwardly incompatible with ordinary facts concerning, say, the relative positions of
items on my desk, immediately following the discussion of picturing in the 2.1s, 2.201 de-
clares: ‘A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence
of states of affairs.’17 Similarly, immediately following the discussion of the pictorial nature
of sentences in the 4.0s, 4.1 declares: ‘Sentences represent the existence and non-existence
of states of affairs.’ Corresponding to the configuration of objects in states of affairs is the
configuration of names in elementary sentences (4.21, 4.22). We are thus faced with the
question: how is it that an ordinary picture is a representation of the obtaining and non-
obtaining or logically independent states of affairs (cf. 2.201)? Or in the context of language:
how is it that a colloquial sentence is a truth-function of logically independent elementary
sentences (cf. 4.4, 5)?
The answer to this question (or part of an answer) will require us to return, eventually,
to the notion of multiplicity and the reference to Hertz’s dynamical models at 4.04. But
the starting place is the idea that both the colloquial sentence and the corresponding fully
analysed sentence are projections of the situation they represent.
17See also 2.11.
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4.3 PROJECTION
The notion of projection is introduced and discussed in the remarks following 3.1, and then
occurs once again at 4.0141:
3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a sentence (whether written or spoken, etc.) as a
projection of a possible situation.
Thinking the sense of the sentence is the method of projection.18
4.0141 In the fact that there is a general rule by which the musician is able to read the
symphony from the score, and that there is a rule by which one could reconstruct the
symphony from the line on a gramophone record and from this again—by means of the first
rule—construct the score, herein lies the internal similarity between these things which at
first sight seem to be entirely different. And the rule is the law of projection which projects
the symphony into the language of the musical score. It is the rule of translation of this
language into the language of the gramophone record.
4.0141 is embedded in the discussion of the essentially pictorial nature of sentences. The
following remark at 4.015 asserts that ‘all imagery, all our pictorial modes of expression,
is contained in the logic of depiction’, and at 4.016 Wittgenstein claims that alphabets
developed out of hieroglyphs ‘without losing what was essential to picturing’. Recall that a
picture is a picture in virtue of the pictorial form that it shares with what it represents.19
This is what imbues the correlations between the elements of a picture and the associated
objects with the significance that they have.20 Wittgenstein describes such correlations as
‘the feelers of the picture’s elements, with which the picture touches reality’ (2.1515), a
metaphor that he couples with a simile of a measuring ruler:
2.1512 [A picture] is laid against reality like a measure.
2.15121 Only the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be
measured.
Here the notion of projection comes through clearly: both the feelers and the graduating
lines act as lines of projection, connecting the picture to the situation depicted. Hence
projection can be recognised as intrinsic to the Tractarian conception of picturing from the
18The translation of this particular sentence is the subject of some discussion; see Rhees (1970) p. 39,
Winch (1987) pp. 13-14, and McGuinness (2002b) p. 91.
19Cf. 2.16, 2.17.
20Cf. 2.151-2.1514.
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get-go. Following the introduction of projection at 3.11, 3.12 tells us that a sentence is ‘a
propositional sign in its projective relation to the world’. Then at 3.13 we have the following:
3.13 A sentence includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected.
Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility is.
A sentence, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility
of expressing it.
(‘The content of a sentence’ means the content of a sentence that has sense.)
A sentence contains the form, but not the content of its sense.
Recall that the arrangement of items on my desk had the same pictorial form as the
parked vehicles by dint of the possibility of rearranging them in the relevant ways. The
possibility of rearranging the items on my desk is identical to the possibility of rearranging
the parked vehicles; it is the possibility common to any linear ordering of three things. Here
is a sense, then, in which a model ‘contains’ the possibility of the situation it represents while
not containing the situation itself.21 On this reading, to say that a representation contains
‘the form, but not the content’ of what it represents is simply to say that they share the
same pictorial form.
Exactly the same is true of sentences—sentences that also share the pictorial form of
what they represent (else they could not represent it). In the case where I describe the
arrangement of the parked vehicles, the possibility of rearranging the words in the relevant
body of sentences is, again, just the possibility of linearly ordering three individuals. Thus
at 3.14 we have an anticipation of the idea emphasised in the run up to 4.03—that sentences
are, after all, particular arrangements of words: ‘What constitutes a propositional sign is
that in it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.’ Indeed,
Wittgenstein draws the comparison between the arrangement of words in a sentence and the
arrangement of the elements of a physical model closer still:
3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed
of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.
3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we
ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’
21The latter notion might bring to mind one of Russell’s memorable remarks to Frege: ‘I believe that in
spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc is itself a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition
‘Mont Blanc is more than 4,000 meters high’.’ 12th December 1904; reprinted in Frege (1982) p. 169.
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At the heart of the Tractarian picture theory is the claim that the use of a sentence-sign as a
projection is like the use of any picture or model. Just as we can think the sense of a sentence
(3.11), so too we can ‘think the sense of’ an arrangement of physical objects. Indeed, in all of
the various ways that we can represent states of affairs, we use arrangements of perceptible
things as projections of possible situations (cf. 4.015).
As noted, 4.0141 is the only place outside of the 3.1s where the term ‘projection’ reoccurs.
Here, we are offered another comparison between linguistic and non-linguistic representation,
and the notion of projection is also extended in the following way. Given two representations
of the same fact (such as a gramophone record and the corresponding score), it is not only
possible to project from either of them to what they represent (to play the record, say, or to
read the score), but also possible to project from one representation to the other (to write a
score by listening to the record, or make a record by playing from the score). There are thus
‘laws of projection’: general rules which carry us from one representation to another, such as
the ‘rule of translation’ from the language of musical notation to the language of gramophone
records.22 Again, this comparison between linguistic and non-linguistic representation is not
metaphorical: ‘A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-
waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between
language and the world’ (4.014).
We can now connect the notion of projection with the notion of multiplicity. At 4.03,
Wittgenstein claims that a sentence must be ‘essentially connected’ with the situation it
depicts, and that this essential connection ‘is precisely that it is its logical picture.’ The
notion of multiplicity is then introduced at 4.04 as a feature of this essential connection—
sentence and situation must have exactly as many distinguishable parts as one another; they
must have the same multiplicity. When Wittgenstein introduces the notion of projection at
3.11 he is considering the ordinary colloquial sentence (‘whether spoken or written’), but at
3.2 he turns to a consideration of the completely analysed sentence. According to 4.03, both
a colloquial and a completely analysed sentence are only sentences by dint of being logical
22Both the simple idea of projection and the potential complexities involved are evident in this example.
Although we may be perfectly confident that the written score can indeed be reconstructed from the gramo-
phone record, actually carrying out such a reconstruction could prove very difficult in practice, especially in
the absence of a record player!
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pictures of what they represent. The discussion of projection as applied to the gramophone
record and the musical score at 4.0141 can thus be carried over and applied to the colloquial
sentence and the fully analysed sentence. Just as there is a general rule by which we can
translate between the record and the score, so there is a general rule by which we can
translate between the colloquial sentence and the fully analysed sentence. Herein lies the
‘internal similarity between these things which at first sight seem to be entirely different’.23
We have thus seen the drawing together of the notions of logical picture, projection and
multiplicity. For a sentence to represent a situation is for it to be a logical picture of that
situation; for a sentence to be a logical picture is for there to be a method of projection that
employs its essential connection with that situation; and if a sentence can be projected in
this way then it must have the same multiplicity as the situation it depicts. Importantly, this
is as true for the fully analysed sentence as it is for the colloquial sentence: both are logical
pictures of the situation they represent, both can be used as a projection of that situation,
and all three (the colloquial sentence, the fully analysed sentence, and the situation itself)
must have the same multiplicity.
4.4 DYNAMICAL MODELS
Why, then, does Wittgenstein refer his readers to Hertz’s dynamical models at 4.04? A
dynamical model captures the number and type of the degrees of freedom of the target
phenomenon, reflecting these in the dimensionality and geometry of configuration space.
In this way a dynamical model provides a complete specification of the target system: it
captures all and only the mechanical features of that system. (The underlying ontological
details are not reflected in a dynamical model precisely because those details are irrelevant
for the task of characterising a system’s mechanical behaviour.) As a result, dynamical
models make perspicuous the significant content of ordinary mechanical descriptions. It is
23Cf. 3.343: ‘Definitions are rules for translating from one language into another. Any correct sign-
language must be translatable into any other in accordance with such rules: it is this that they all have in
common.’ We will see how this idea connects up with the central Tractarian notion of the general sentence-
form, below.
81
not that such ordinary descriptions fail to represent a system’s degrees of freedom; rather,
the ordinary description may fail to make these features of the system explicit, and may
imbue other, inessential, features with unwarranted significance. As an illustrative case,
recall the example of the dumbbell system from the previous chapter.24 In that example it
is evident that the use of ordinary Cartesian coordinates obscures—but does not falsify—
the true number of degrees of freedom of the target system. In contrast, a description
using specially adapted general coordinates can present the degrees of freedom of the system
explicitly.
Let us examine the distinctive way that Hertz allows for the construction of dynamical
models by appealing to subsystems of hidden masses. In ordinary mechanical descriptions,
forces do work on a system by accelerating the observed masses, thereby converting potential
energy into kinetic energy. In the framework of Principles, Hertz models potential energy as
the kinetic energy of hidden masses instead, as one might imagine tapping into the kinetic
energy stored in a system of hidden flywheels. However, Hertz’s procedure can then appear
perplexing in the way explored in chapter 1. In the absence of plausible mechanisms that
would actually produce the observed motions, Hertz’s approach can seem remarkably specu-
lative. But such an interpretation misses the central role of dynamical models in Principles
and the connection with Hertz’s picture theory. As we have seen, it is precisely through the
hypothesis of hidden masses that Hertz limits what can be learnt about a mechanical system
to what is conveyed by a dynamical model:
If we admit generally and without limitation that hypothetical masses (§301) can exist
in nature in addition to those which can be directly determined by the balance, then it
is impossible to carry our knowledge of the connections of natural systems further than is
involved in specifying models of the actual systems. We can then, in fact, have no knowledge
as to whether the systems which we consider in mechanics agree in any other respect with
the actual systems of nature which we intend to consider, than in this alone—that the one
set of systems are models of the other. (§427)
The significance of Hertz’s hidden masses can be made clear by examining the method of
Lagrange multipliers. Lagrange multipliers provide a powerful method for solving constrained
variational problems by transforming to a dynamically equivalent ‘free’ problem. A generic
24See above—chapter 3, section 3.4.
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variational problem involves determining the extreme value of some function, F (p1, ..., pr),
by finding where its variation vanishes:
r∑
ρ=1
∂F
∂pρ
δpρ = 0 (4.1)
In an unconstrained problem the variables pρ are independent of one another, but in a
constrained problem there will be at least one constraint equation:
f(p1, .., pr) = 0 (4.2)
This prevents the variables pρ from varying independently. In fact, we could re-arrange our
constraint equation to make the final variable explicitly dependent on the others:
pr = f
′(p1, ..., pr−1) (4.3)
We can then use this to eliminate pr from (4.1) and solve for the remaining independent
variables. More generally: we can re-arrange k constraint equations so as to eliminate k
variables, then solve for the r − k independent variables that we are left with. However,
proceeding in this manner can be extremely cumbersome. Moreover, if the constraint equa-
tions are symmetric then dividing the variables into those that are dependent and those that
are independent will be entirely arbitrary. It is here, then, that the method of Lagrange
multipliers shows its strength: rather than reducing the number of variables in this way,
we can introduce additional variables which allow us to work with a dynamically equivalent
‘free’ problem instead.
To do this, we take the variation of our constraint equation, (4.2):
r∑
ρ=1
∂f
∂pρ
δpρ = 0 (4.4)
Because it is equal to zero, we can multiply the left hand side of this equation by an arbitrary
factor, λ, and then add it to the left hand side of (4.1). In other words, solving our original
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variational problem is equivalent to solving the following variational problem:
r∑
ρ=1
∂F
∂pρ
δpρ + λ
r∑
ρ=1
∂f
∂pρ
δpρ = 0 (4.5)
So far we have merely added zero to the original problem. However, we can now use the
hitherto undetermined value of λ to eliminate the coefficients of pr by specifying that λ
satisfies the following equation:
∂F
∂pr
δpr + λ
∂f
∂pr
δpr = 0 (4.6)
Fixing the value of λ in this way renders our problem independent of pr. We can then
proceed as if our original r variables are independent. More generally: given k constraint
equations we can introduce k multipliers and fix their values so as to eliminate the coefficients
of the final k variables. Again, we are then free to proceed as if the original r variables are
independent. Thus, rather than using the constraint equations to solve for the r−k quantities
p1, ..., pr−k, we introduce additional factors and solve for the r + k quantities p1, ..., pr and
λ1, ..., λk. The advantage of proceeding in this way is that we can now apply the methods
appropriate to an unconstrained problem to our modified function:
F ? = F + λ1f1 + ...+ λkfk (4.7)
Let us witness this technique as applied to Hamilton’s principle. As we saw in chapter
3, this principle requires the vanishing of a system’s Lagrangian:
δ
∫ t2
t1
L dt = 0 (4.8)
Using Lagrange multipliers, if the system is subject to constraints then instead of solving
(4.8) we solve:
δ
∫ t2
t1
L dt+ δ
∫ t2
t1
(λ1δf1 + ...+ λkδfk) dt = 0 (4.9)
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Importantly, we can regard this as applying Hamilton’s principle directly to a modified
Lagrangian, L? = L+ λ1f1 + ...+ λkfk:
δ
∫ t2
t1
L? dt = 0 (4.10)
We can regard L? as describing a system that is dynamically equivalent to the original system.
As before, the advantage of considering L? instead of L is that we can regard the former as
‘free’: we can apply the techniques appropriate to an unconstrained problem.
For Hertz, Lagrange multipliers provide a uniform and simple way to express the equa-
tions of motion of any mechanical system. In the context of Principles, the problem of
determining a system’s equations of motion reduces to the problem of minimizing the cur-
vature of the system’s path through configuration space. Hertz thus derives necessary and
sufficient conditions for the curvature of a system’s path to take a minimum value (§§158,159)
and then derives a general expression for a system’s equations of motion (cf. §371).25 Em-
ploying a generalized acceleration vector, fρ (§277), the equations of motion for a system
with no connections is very simple:
mfρ = 0 (4.11)
However, a system with connections has k ‘equations of constraint’:
r∑
ρ=1
pχρp
′
ρ = 0 (4.12)
As before, we could proceed by re-arranging these constraint equations so as to express some
of the variables as dependent on the others, and then solve for the remaining r− k indepen-
dent variables that we are left with. Instead of doing this, Hertz introduces undetermined
Lagrange multipliers, Pχ, and incorporates these into the system’s equations of motions as
follows:
mfρ +
k∑
χ=1
pχρPχ = 0 (4.13)
25For a more detailed discussion of Hertz’s derivation of a system’s equations of motion, see Appendix B.
85
Hertz can then solve for the r + k variables pρ and Pχ while treating them as independent.
The only difference for a ‘system acted on by forces’ (a coupled system) is that we simply
apply this trick a second time: we introduce r additional factors Pρ (where Pρ = 0 for any
uncoupled coordinates) and solve for a total of 2r + k variables:
mfρ +
k∑
χ=1
pχρPχ + Pρ = 0 (4.14)
In terms of the core impact on Hertz’s formulation of mechanics, this is what the in-
troduction of hidden masses amounts to: the hypothesis of hidden masses leads to a simple
and uniform method for writing down the equations of motion for any mechanical system.
On Hertz’s picture theory, correctly modelling a system’s motion over time is the ultimate
achievement of a physical description, and this is precisely what is achieved by capturing a
system’s degrees of freedom in a dynamical model. Once one is freed from the task of seeking
concrete mechanisms of hidden masses, the power of Hertz’s approach becomes clear. In fact,
it becomes a great advantage of Hertz’s framework that phenomena can be modelled very
simply by employing dynamical models in this way:
In order to determine beforehand the course of the natural motion of a material system,
it is sufficient to have a model of that system. The model may be much simpler than the
system whose motion it represents. (§425)
Hertz’s framework thus provides a uniform method for displaying the degrees of freedom
of mechanical systems; a uniform method for displaying the essential content of ordinary
mechanical descriptions. With this in view, Wittgenstein’s reference to dynamical models
at 4.04 becomes intelligible. The ‘multiplicity’ that is shared by the ordinary mechanical
description, the Hertzian description, and the phenomenon itself is the number and type
of the system’s degrees of freedom.26 This multiplicity is present at least implicitly, per-
haps obscurely, in the ordinary mechanical description, but displayed perspicuously by a
dynamical model. A system’s degrees of freedom is thus the mechanical analogue for the
multiplicity that is common between the colloquial sentence, fully analysed sentence, and
depicted situation in the Tractatus.
26Note that, here and elsewhere, I am intentionally trading on the ambiguity of the term ‘system’, which
can be used to refer both to the symbolic representation and the real world phenomenon.
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4.5 THE MULTIPLICITY OF A SENTENCE
Although it is possible to identify the multiplicity of a mechanical system concretely via
its degrees of freedom, it is harder to identify the multiplicity of a sentence in a similarly
concrete way.27 However, we can make progress on this front by turning to the remarks
following 4.04. At 4.041 Wittgenstein claims that the multiplicity of a sentence ‘cannot
itself be the subject of depiction’, rather one ‘cannot get away from it when depicting.’28
Wittgenstein then elaborates on this remark through a discussion of the way in which certain
variants of the generality notation would fail to be adequate because they lack the necessary
multiplicity:
4.0411 If, for example, we wanted to express what we now write as ‘∀x(fx)’29 by putting
an affix in front of ‘fx’—for instance by writing ‘Gen.fx’—it would not be adequate: we
should not know what was being generalised. If we wanted to signalize it with an affix
‘g’—for instance by writing ‘f(xg)’—that would not be adequate either: we should not
know the scope of the generality-sign.
If we were to try to do it by introducing a mark into the argument places—for instance
by writing ‘(G,G).F (G,G)’—it would not be adequate: we should not be able to establish
the identity of the variables. And so on.
All these modes of signifying are inadequate because they lack the necessary mathe-
matical multiplicity.
The problems that Wittgenstein identifies in these variant notations are reasonably
straightforward. Taking the second variant as an example, if we attempted to notate gener-
ality using an affix—such as by replacing ‘∀x(fx)’ with ‘f(xg)’—this would be inadequate
because ‘we should not know the scope of the generality-sign’. Consider the following two
propositional functions:
1. fx
2. fx ⊃ p
27Furthermore, in the context of the Tractatus we have no ‘external’ perspective—no perspective outside
of logic and language from which to reflect on logic and language. This is a peculiar and central problem at
the heart of the Tractatus that has no analogue in Principles. Here I just mention it in passing.
28It would distract from my main theme to turn to a discussion of why the multiplicity of a sentence
is something that can be shown, and not said. For one proposal for how to interpret 4.041 in this regard
however, see Kremer (1992).
29Note that I have substituted the more familiar notation, ‘∀x(fx)’, for the notation used in the Tractatus,
‘(x).fx’
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Using the standard notation, we can form two sentences with the universal quantifier as
follows:
1*. (∀x)(fx)
2*. (∀x)(fx ⊃ p)
From 1* we can form a third sentence:
3*. (∀x)(fx) ⊃ p
Note that the scope of the quantifier tracks the difference between sentences 2* and 3*.
However, using the variant notation our original sentences would be translated as follows:
1?. f(xg)
2?. f(xg) ⊃ p
We can now no longer form a third sentence in the way we did before: the attempt to do
so simply reproduces f(xg) ⊃ p. Hence, as Wittgenstein remarks, the variant notation fails
to indicate the scope of the generality-sign. The other two variant notations face similar
problems: we can’t replace ‘∀x(fx)’ with ‘Gen.fx’ because we need to be able to identify
the bound variable, and we can’t replace ‘∀x(fx)’ with ‘(G,G).F (G,G)’ because we need
to be able to distinguish different variables (x, y, z, etc.), particularly when one quantifier
appears within the scope of another.
The three variants suggest that the multiplicity of the generality notation can be recog-
nised in the scope of the generalization, the identification of bound variables, and the distinc-
tion of different variables. Given that range of examples, however, it seems that we might as
well regard any significant feature of the notation as falling under the heading ‘multiplicity’.
In the case of an adequate generality notation, 4.0411 helps to specify what these significant
features are. As Michael Kremer has argued, the three variants help us to see that any ade-
quate generality notation must be able to identify bound variables, determine a quantifier’s
scope, and allow for one quantifier to occur within the scope of another (cf. Kremer (1992),
pp. 411-412). The upshot seems to be this: as Wittgenstein is using the term, ‘multiplicity’
encompasses all the features of a notation that are necessary for it to do the work it purports
to do.
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Here, however, we should keep in mind Wittgenstein’s distinction between the essential
and merely accidental features of a sentence (or symbol):
3.34 A sentence possesses essential and accidental features.
Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the proposi-
tional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the sentence could not
express its sense.
3.341 So what is essential in a sentence is what all sentences that can express the same
sense have in common.
And similarly, in general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols that can
serve the same purpose have in common.
Equivalent (and hence equally adequate) notations have different features, and some of the
features that are needed when using one notation are not needed in another.30 But such
features are accidental—they result from ‘the particular way the propositional signs are
produced’. What is essential, by contrast, is what all adequate notations have in common.
This makes the identification of such features a difficult task, and on this point Wittgenstein’s
reference to Hertz is particularly helpful. Within the limited scope of Principles, what all
adequate notations have in common are the resources to represent the number and type of
a mechanical system’s degrees of freedom. Within the much broader scope of the Tractatus,
however, what all adequate notations have in common are the resources to represent any
situation at all. In aiming to identify the essential features of sentences tout court, our task
becomes, in the words of 4.5: ‘to give the sentences of any sign language whatsoever in such
a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and
every symbol satisfying the description can give a sense’. Here, then, we have arrived at the
central Tractarian notion of the general sentence-form.
The general sentence-form represents an arbitrary truth-function of an arbitrary num-
ber of independent elementary sentences, employing iterated applications of joint-negation
to capture the familiar logical operations (conjunction, disjunction, etc.).31 According to
the Tractatus, every sentence with sense can be written as a truth-function of elementary
30Compare, for example, the use of parentheses in Russellian notation with the absence of parentheses in
Polish notation.
31The extent of the logical resources that the general sentence-form makes available should not be un-
derestimated. For discussions of how far these resources extend, see for example Floyd (2002) and Ricketts
(2014).
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sentences; thus every sentence with sense is an instance of the general sentence-form. The re-
sources for analysis that the general sentence-form makes available include truth-operations
applied to elementary sentences and to sentences that are themselves truth-functions of
elementary sentences. At the level of independent elementary sentences the resources for
analysis also include the interlocking forms of elementary sentences and forms of names of
objects.32
The construction of sentences from elementary sentences can be illustrated by returning
to one of the variant notations canvassed in 4.0411. In particular, note that replacing ‘∀x(fx)’
with ‘Gen.(x)’ runs into trouble with a sentence such as the following:
∀(x)(∀(y)Rxy ⊃ ∀(y)Ryx)
It seems that the variant notation simply lacks sufficient resources to reproduce this sen-
tence.33 But the resources that the general sentence-form has available fare better. To see
how to construct this sentence from elementary sentences, let us first treat Rab as an ele-
mentary sentence.34 From here, our next step is to replace the name ‘b’ with a variable ‘y’ to
form the propositional function Ray. The familiar quantifier notation provides a shorthand
for the logical sum (conjunction) of the values of this function, ∀(y)Ray, and in a similar
way we can form the sentence ∀(y)Rya from the elementary sentence Rba. From these two
sentences we now form the conditional ∀(y)Ray ⊃ ∀(y)Rya.35 Note that it is important
that the same name, ‘a’, occurs in the antecedent and the consequent (derived from the
fact that both were formed by starting with elementary sentences which contained ‘a’). At
this point, we can replace ‘a’ with the variable ‘x’ to arrive at a new propositional function:
∀(y)Rxy ⊃ ∀(y)Ryx. Forming the logical sum of the values of this function, we arrive back
32The form of a particular object is its possibilities of being related to other objects in states of affairs
(2.0141), and the form of a particular state of affairs is the possibility that objects be related in that way
(2.031-2.033). The form of a name then mirrors the form of the object it names, and the form of an elementary
sentence mirrors the form of the state of affairs it asserts to obtain.
33Here I follow Kremer (1992) p. 415.
34It is a commonplace in the literature to treat a sentence such as ‘Rab’ as a candidate elementary
sentence while putting to one side the various controversial issues concerning what a genuine example of
an elementary sentence might be. Though nothing here turns on such issues, I follow Ricketts (2014) in
regarding the asymmetric relation exemplified by Rab as in fact constructed from more basic elementary
sentences—cf. Ricketts (2014) pp. 273-274.
35To see how to construct a conditional sentence using successive applications of joint-negation, see Ricketts
(2013) p. 127.
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at our original sentence: ∀(x)(∀(y)Rxy ⊃ ∀(y)Ryx).
The discussion of the multiplicity of generality notation in 4.0411 provides a central
example of the essential features of sentences, in particular the essential features of sentences
capable of expressing generality. Following from this, and taking a cue from Wittgenstein’s
reference to Hertz, I propose that multiplicity in the Tractatus encompasses the essential
features of any sentence. These are precisely the features which the complete analysis of a
sentence makes explicit. At the same time, such features must already be present, if tacit,
in the colloquial sentence. (If they were not, the colloquial sentence would not be able to
express its sense.) This has a clear parallel in Principles : a mechanical system’s degrees
of freedom must be tacit in an ordinary mechanical description of that system, otherwise
it would not be a description of that system. A dynamical model simply stands to make a
system’s degrees of freedom explicit.
In Hertz’s context, the notion of degrees of freedom is the relevant multiplicity ; the
number and type of a system’s degrees of freedom constitute the essential features of that
system. This is what is common in the ordinary description, the fully analysed description,
and the target phenomenon. What corresponds to degrees of freedom in the Tractatus? Writ-
ing a sentence as a truth-function of elementary sentences shows which truth-possibilities
of elementary sentences the sentence agrees and disagrees with (4.4). Implication relations
between colloquial sentences are then analysed as follows: if the truth-possibilities of elemen-
tary sentences with which a given sentence agrees include within them the truth-possibilities
with which another sentence agrees, then the first sentence follows from (is implied by) the
second. Wittgenstein describes this case by saying that the sense of the second sentence is
contained in the sense of the first (5.122). This is made vivid by truth-table notation: the
fact that the truth of ‘p’ is implied by the truth of ‘p.q’ is shown by the fact that the truth-
possibilities with which ‘p’ expresses agreement (the first and third rows of the truth-table,
below) include the truth-possibility with which ‘p.q’ expresses agreement (the first row):
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p q p p.q
T T T T
F T F F
T F T F
F F F F
Other logical relationships can be accommodated in a similar fashion—if the truth-
possibilities with which one sentence expresses agreement are at the same time the truth-
possibilities with which a second sentence expresses disagreement, then the truth of either
sentence implies the falsity of the other (their senses exclude each other), and so on. Tractar-
ian analysis thus employs the logical resources made available by the general sentence-form
to capture the logical relationships among colloquial sentences in terms of sense inclusion
and exclusion; in terms of agreement and disagreement with truth-possibilities of elemen-
tary sentences. In this way, the complete analysis of colloquial sentences makes their logical
relationships explicit.
According to the Tractatus, such logical relationships can also be recognised as holding
between the situations that sentences depict. The opening of the Tractatus famously declares:
‘The world is the totality of facts, not things’, and ‘The facts in logical space are the world’
(1.1, 1.13). On this view, situations—just like sentences—occupy locations in logical space.
Thus, just as sentences carry with them their logical relationships with other sentences, facts
carry with them their logical relationships with other facts. Here we have found a central
commonality between the colloquial sentence, the fully analysed sentence, and the depicted
situation: all three are, so to speak, linked to the same node in logical space. Here too
we find the significance of the claim that sentences—and pictures more generally—represent
a possibility of the existence and non-existence of states of affairs (2.11, 2.201, 4.1). If a
sentence is true then the situation it depicts obtains; in that case a number of elementary
sentences will also be true, and so a number of states of affairs will also obtain. Here is a
sense, then, in which sentence and situation have exactly as many distinguishable parts as
one another—a sense in which the colloquial sentence, fully analysed sentence, and depicted
situation have the same multiplicity.
The comparison of Tractarian analysis with Hertzian analysis—and the understanding of
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the notion of multiplicity that this comparison makes available—substantiates a suggestive
metaphor for the relationship between the colloquial sentence and the fully analysed sentence
articulated by Cora Diamond:
On the one hand there is the fully analysed sentence, which would lay out clearly in front of
us what function of what expressions a sentence really is. To get what is going to be on the
other hand we have to think of lifting up an ordinary sentence, and noticing, attached to it,
like little wires, all the sentences which entail that it is true or that it is not. The ordinary
sentence, together with all its little wires, is the same sentence as the fully analysed one.
So we can understand the ordinary sentence even though we do not know how to carry out
its full analysis. (Diamond, 1988, p. 19)
To make a parallel remark concerning Principles, we can say that the ordinary mechanical
description is indeed the same description as the corresponding (fully analysed) dynamical
model. And, of course, we can note that physicists can (and still do) understand ordinary me-
chanical descriptions in perfect ignorance of dynamical models. The achievement of Hertzian
analysis is to display the multiplicity of ordinary mechanical descriptions, thus making per-
spicuous the essential features of those ordinary descriptions. Similarly, the achievement
of Tractarian analysis is to display the multiplicity of ordinary colloquial sentences, thus
making perspicuous the essential features of those sentences. Just as in the mechanical case,
however, there is of course no need to wait upon such analysis in order to get on with using
ordinary sentences.
4.6 MODELS AND MULTIPLICITIES
A central feature of a logically-oriented interpretation of the Tractatus—a feature which can
be illustrated through the comparison with Principles—can be glossed as follows: Wittgen-
stein’s motivation to introduce names of simple objects is to provide a uniform method for
displaying the logical relations among colloquial sentences in terms of sense inclusion and
exclusion, so that all sentences with sense can be recognised as instances of the general
sentence-form. The parallel feature of Principles is the following: Hertz’s motivation to
introduce hidden masses and Massenteilchen is to provide a uniform method for displaying
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the degrees of freedom of mechanical systems in dynamical models, so that all mechanical
phenomena can be recognised as falling under the fundamental law.
‘Multiplicity’ encompasses all the essential features of a representation—all the features
that allow it to do the representational work it purports to do. This can be spelt out in
the context of Principles as follows. On Hertz’s austere account of the essential content of
classical mechanics, the only information that a mechanical description conveys is what is
contained in a dynamical model.36 In the context of Principles, multiplicity encompasses all
the essential features of descriptions in classical mechanics. In the context of the Tractatus,
however, multiplicity encompasses all the essential features of descriptions tout court. In
both cases, the essential features are typically tacit in ordinary or colloquial descriptions,
but displayed explicitly when those descriptions are written in their fully analysed form.
On an ontolgoically-oriented interpretation, simple objects imbue the names in elemen-
tary sentences with meaning, and elementary sentences ground the meaningfulness of col-
loquial sentences. It is thus the simple objects occurring in states of affairs, independently
of language and thought, which gives significance to the forms of names and the forms of
elementary sentences. On a logically-oriented interpretation, by contrast, analysis uncovers
whatever forms of elementary sentences and forms of names are needed in order to capture
the manifest logical relationships among colloquial sentences. On this view, it is the sense
of colloquial sentences which accounts for the sense of elementary sentences (and hence the
meaningfulness of the names of simple objects), not the other way around. Indeed, elemen-
tary sentences and the names of simple objects do not have any significance apart from the
analysis of colloquial sentences.37
This ontologically-oriented and logically-oriented distinction can also be used to charac-
terize contrasting interpretations of Principles. On an ontologically-oriented interpretation,
Hertz’s Massenteilchen would be an unfamiliar kind of fundamental particle, and the hy-
pothesis of hidden masses would be a bold ontological gambit. On such an interpretation,
36As Hertz articulates the point at §427: ‘[We can], in fact, have no knowledge as to whether the systems
which we consider in mechanics agree in any other respect with the actual systems of nature which we intend
to consider, than in this alone—that the one set of systems are models of the other.’
37Cf. Ricketts (2014) p. 275: ‘This view of Tractarian objects explains why Wittgenstein avoids offering any
informative characterization of what kinds of objects there are or might be. Given the holism of Tractarian
analysis, there is no such characterization in advance of analysis. There is only the rewriting of sentences to
make explicit what truth-functions of which elementary sentences they are.’
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if it turns out that such entities don’t actually exist, then so much the worse for Hertz’s
grand reformulation of mechanics. On a logically-oriented interpretation however—the kind
of interpretation defended in this thesis—the entire motivation to talk in terms of material
points and Massenteilchen is to display the essential content of mechanical descriptions in
the form of dynamical models. Given a particular mechanical phenomenon, we can analyse
it into a connected system of material points, introducing hidden masses to correctly capture
its degrees of freedom as needed. The relative masses of these material points (both hid-
den and visible) is what then determines the relative numbers of Massenteilchen occupying
those locations at those times. On a logically-oriented view, the material points and Massen-
teilchen do not have significance apart from the descriptions in which they occur—they are
introduced to allow for a uniform analysis of mechanical phenomena, not as a speculative
ontological posit.
As I have been concerned to show earlier in this thesis, there are strong and mutually
supporting lines of evidence in favour of this kind of logically-oriented interpretation of
Hertz’s project. This evidence emerges at three important places in particular: in Hertz’s
original motivation to introduce Massenteilchen, in the role of the hypothesis of hidden
masses, and in the overarching significance of Hertz’s picture theory of representation.
Hertz’s primary motivation to introduce Massenteilchen is to derive the appropriate equa-
tion for the displacement of a system (i.e. the appropriate metric structure for configuration
space).38 If Massenteilchen are interpreted as a strange kind of fundamental particle, this
motivation appears wholly inadequate. On the other hand, if Massenteilchen are interpreted
as an analytical device that allows for a perspicuous description of mechanical systems, then
such a motivation is just what one might expect. Regarding Hertz’s hidden masses, we have
seen that their fundamental role is to allow for a uniform analysis of mechanical phenomena.
This role is evident both in Hertz’s strategy for accommodating forces by introducing ad-
ditional cyclic coordinates (i.e. appealing to connected sub-systems of hidden masses) and
also in Hertz’s justification of the adequacy of dynamical models as complete descriptions
of mechanical systems. Hertz makes clear that the hypothesis of hidden masses rules out
knowledge of fundamental ontological structure, and that what we can actually learn about
38See above, chapter 2 section 2.3.2
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a mechanical system is precisely the information conveyed by a dynamical model.39 This
brings us to the picture theory of representation that frames Principles. On Hertz’s austere
account of representation, the ultimate achievement of a mechanical description is to cor-
rectly model the target system’s motion over time, hence to capture that system’s degrees of
freedom in a dynamical model. It is no accident, then, that it is precisely in the discussion
of dynamical models that Hertz refers back to the picture theory of his introduction.40
It is also worth recalling that Hertz makes clear that he is engaged in a task of clarifi-
cation; that his aim in Principles is to distill the ‘essential content’ of classical mechanics
from its customary representation.41 In this vein, it is helpful to recall Hertz’s earlier the-
oretical achievement of distilling the essential content of the theory of electromagnetism
from Maxwell’s sprawling Treatise. On a logically-oriented interpretation of Principles, the
Hertzian slogan—‘Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s system of equations’—takes on a special
significance, showing that Hertz’s austere conception of the essential content of a scientific
theory significantly predated his work on classical mechanics. This is what developed into
the picture theory of Principles.42 Given Hertz’s account of representation, the task of clar-
ifying classical mechanics requires explicitly abstracting away from the imaginative devices
and constructable models that might be employed in ordinary treatments of mechanical
problems.43 Hertz’s succinct statement of his ambitions at the end of his preface is thus
entirely consonant with a logically-oriented interpretation of his work:
In the details I have not brought forward anything that is new and which could not be found
in many books. What I hope is new, and to which alone I attach value, is the arrangement
39Cf. §427: ‘it is impossible to carry our knowledge of the connections of natural systems further than is
involved in specifying models of the actual systems. We can then, in fact, have no knowledge as to whether
the systems which we consider in mechanics agree in any other respect with the actual systems of nature
which we intend to consider, than in this alone—that the one set of systems are models of the other.’
40Cf. §428: ‘The relation of a dynamical model to the system of which it is regarded as the model, is
precisely the same as the relation of the pictures which our mind forms of things to the things themselves’.
41Recall Hertz’s letter to Cohn in November of 1891: ‘I would like to put something straight and arrange
the concepts in such a way that one can see more clearly what are the definitions and what are the facts of
experience, such as, for example, concepts of force and inertia. I am already convinced that it is possible to
obtain great simplifications here.’ (cf. Lu¨tzen (2005) p. 74)
42Recall that in order to clarify electromagnetism, Hertz wrote that the theory ‘should be so constructed
as to allow its logical foundations to be easily recognised; all unessential ideas should be removed from it,
and the relations of the essential ideas should be reduced to their simplest form’ (Hertz, 1893, p. 195).
43Here we might recall one final famous Hertzian remark, from Electric Waves: ‘scientific accuracy requires
of us that we should in no wise confuse the simple and homely figure, as it is presented to us by nature, with
the gay garment which we use to clothe it’ (Hertz, 1893, p. 28).
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and presentation of the whole, and thus the logical, or, if one wants, the philosophical
aspect of the matter. My work has accomplished its objective or failed insofar as it has
gained something in this direction or not. (Hertz, 1899, xxiv)
Both Hertz and Wittgenstein introduce unfamiliar entities, whether in the form of
Massenteilchen and hidden masses or in the form of simple objects. An overarching concern
of this thesis has been the seemingly speculative nature of such a procedure. In Hertz’s
case, the uniformity and simplicity that can be attained in the description of mechanical
systems (and in particular, the fact that all systems can be seen to fall under the fundamen-
tal law) serves as the major motivation for approaching mechanical problems in a novel and
unfamiliar way:
...we are bound to answer the question how a new, unusual, and comprehensive mode of
expression justifies itself, and what advantages we expect from using it. In answering this
question we specify as the first advantage that it enables us to render the most general and
comprehensive statements with great simplicity and brevity. In fact, propositions relating
to whole systems do not require more words or more ideas than are usually employed in
referring to a single point. (Hertz, 1899, pp. 30-31)
In Wittgenstein’s case, the uniformity and simplicity attained in accommodating logical
relationships among colloquial sentences in terms of sense containment and exclusion (and
in particular, the fact that all sentences can be seen to be instances of the general sentence-
form) serves as a parallel motivation for the introduction of simple objects. This is, of course,
tied to a logically-oriented interpretation of the Tractatus. As I hope to have brought out,
such an interpretation rescues the Tractatus from seeming disappointingly speculative, or
even particularly implausible. More specifically, I have argued that Wittgenstein’s reference
to Hertz’s dynamical models at 4.04 should be recognised as a critical piece of textual
evidence in favour of a logically-oriented interpretation of the Tractatus. I have also argued
that Hertz provides a distinctive conception of the termination of logically-oriented analysis;
a conception on which analysis does not lead to a complete specification of ontological
constitution.
There is one further aspect of the comparison between Principles and the Tractatus that
should be noted here. Recall that one of Hertz’s overarching goals is to alleviate confusions
that trace back to the conflicting demands on the term ‘force’. Hertz disentangles these
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demands by providing a notational framework in which all forces can be treated on the
model of constraint forces, but it is important to note that Hertz has not thereby answered
the question: what is the nature of force? In the famous passage from Hertz’s introduction
which so resonated with Wittgenstein, Hertz claims that ‘the answer which we want is not
really an answer to this question’. Here is how that passage concludes:
When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature of force will
not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate
questions. (Hertz, 1899, p. 8)
Hertz’s suggestion, then, is that once a certain perspective is achieved, certain confused
questions will no longer seem pressing. It would be uncontentious to claim that this idea
played an important role in Wittgenstein’s later conception of the ambitions of philosophy.
What is less widely appreciated, however, is the extent of this Hertzian influence already in
the Tractatus.44 The central concern of this final chapter has been to interpret Wittgenstein’s
reference to Hertz’s dynamical models at 4.04 and thereby uncover the parallels between
Wittgenstein’s analysis of sentences and Hertz’s analysis of mechanical systems. All this,
however, only bulwarks the claim that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical problems
was deeply influenced by Hertz already in the Tractatus : Wittgenstein took inspiration both
from the way in which Hertz provided an analytical framework for classical mechanics and
from Hertz’s conception of what providing such an analytical framework achieved.
44Michael Kremer is one of the relatively few commentators who recognises Hertz’s influence here: ‘It is
true that all of the passages [where Wittgenstein refers to Hertz’s introduction] are drawn from his middle
to late works. But Wittgenstein encountered Hertz’s ideas even before he became a student of Russell’s, and
it is my contention that the conception of philosophical problems and their solution that he found in Hertz
was crucial to his approach to philosophy from the beginning.’ (Kremer, 2012, p. 16)
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APPENDIX A
MASSENTEILCHEN AND THE GEOMETRY OF CONFIGURATION
SPACE
In Principles, the geometry of configuration space is specially adapted to the mechanical
system under consideration (see above, chapter 2 section 2.3.2). More specifically, the de-
termination of distances and angles—the metric structure of configuration space—is linked
to the particular mass-distribution of the system. In order to derive this metric structure,
Hertz introduces the notion of Massenteilchen.
In ordinary Euclidean space, the distance between two points is determined by the fa-
miliar Pythagorean metric:
ds2 = dx2 + dy2 + dz2
To transpose the structure of ordinary Euclidean geometry into configuration space, we
would simply have to generalise the Pythagorean metric to a higher number of dimen-
sions. A system with n material points has a configuration space with 3n dimensions:
x1, x2, x3, ..., x3n−2, x3n−1, x3n. Hence a generalised Pythagorean metric has the form:
ds2 = dx21 + dx
2
2 + dx
2
3 + ...+ dx
2
3n−2 + dx
2
3n−1 + dx
2
3n
Or more compactly:
ds2 =
3n∑
i=1
dx2i
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However, this Euclidean structure is insufficient to do the work that Hertz requires. Thus
Hertz derives a more exotic metric structure, beginning by first defining the ‘magnitude of
the displacement of a system’ as follows:
The magnitude of the displacement of a system is the quadratic mean value of the magni-
tudes of the displacements of all its Massenteilchen. (Hertz, 1899, §29)
Note here the reference to Massenteilchen. If this definition had referred to material points,
this would have resulted in configuration space having a Pythagorean metric. However,
calculating the displacements of the Massenteilchen instead of the material points weights
the expression for the magnitude of the displacement of a system, so that the more massive
points contribute more to the displacement.1 Using this definition, Hertz derives a metric
for configuration space of the following form (cf. Hertz (1899) §55):
ds2 =
1
m
3n∑
i=1
midx
2
i
Here, m is the total mass of the system (i.e. the sum of the masses of the material points)
and the mi are defined so that the mass of the µ-th material point is proportional to m3µ−2+
m3µ−1 +m3µ.
If instead of using 3n Cartesian coordinates (x1, ..., x3n), we use r general coordinates
(p1, ..., pr),
2 then the metric structure of configuration space takes the following form (Hertz,
1899, §57):
ds2 =
r∑
ρ=1
r∑
σ=1
aρσdpρdpσ
Here, the aρσ are defined as follows:
aρσ =
1
m
3n∑
ν=1
mν
∂xν
∂pρ
∂xν
∂pσ
It is worth emphasising the importance of this metric structure. Hertz is only in a position
to describe all mechanical systems with a single fundamental law because the geometrical
1The demonstration that this was indeed the primary motivation for Hertz to introduce Massenteilchen
is due to Lu¨tzen. For his detailed discussion of the development of the idea of Massenteilchen in the early
drafts of Principles, see Lu¨tzen (2005) pp. 146-158.
2 Note that r is the number of the degrees of freedom of the system.
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structure of configuration space itself incorporates the necessary information regarding the
spatial distribution of the masses making up a system. The key result is that the total
kinetic energy of the system can be represented by the kinetic energy of a single point in
configuration space.3 It is in this way that the mechanics of a single point is carried over to
the mechanics of an arbitrary system:
In this space one point is sufficient to represent the mechanical system, and hence we carry
over the mechanics of a free particle to any mechanical system if we place that particle in
a space of the proper number of dimensions and proper geometry. (Lanczos, 1962, p. 22)
In the context of this thesis, the following should be emphasised. First, the Massen-
teilchen are the true simple objects of Hertz’s framework. In Principles, it is the relative
number of Massenteilchen that defines the notion of mass.4 Thus the parts (so to speak) of a
material point—the Massenteilchen that occupy that spatio-temporal location—have a clear
(indeed, a paramount) logical role. The Massenteilchen themselves have no parts. However,
this point can be (and has been) misconstrued if Massenteilchen are regarded as a strange
kind of fundamental particle. But to interpret them as such would make Hertz’s framework
both speculative and implausible.5 Just as with Hertz’s notion of a material point, Massen-
teilchen are defined entirely by their logical role—it is in the construction of configuration
space, and thus the construction of dynamical models, that they find their significance.
3See above, chapter 2 section 2.3.2.
4Cf. Hertz (1899) §4: ‘The number of Massenteilchen in any space, compared with the number of
Massenteilchen in some chosen space at a fixed time, is called the mass contained in the first space.’
5Hence, as we saw in chapter 2, commentators who have regarded Principles as closely connected with
the search for an ether mechanism have been severely disappointed.
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APPENDIX B
HERTZ’S EQUATIONS OF MOTION
When using rectangular coordinates, the condition that a system’s path has a minimum
curvature is equivalent to the condition that the following quantity takes a minimum value
(cf. §§106, 155):
1
2
3n∑
ν=1
mν
m
(x′′ν)
2 (B.1)
Here, m is the total mass of the system and x′′ν are the second partial differentials of the
coordinates with respect to path length (cf. §100). When using r general coordinates, pρ,
the expression for the curvature of the system’s path takes a significantly more complex form
(cf.§108):
r∑
ρ=1
r∑
σ=1
(
aρσp
′′
ρp
′′
σ +
r∑
τ=1
(
2
∂aρσ
∂pτ
− ∂aρτ
∂pσ
)
p′ρp
′
τp
′
σ +
r∑
λ=1
r∑
µ=1
aρσλµp
′
ρp
′
σp
′
λp
′
µ
)
(B.2)
Here, aρσ and aρσλµ are notational short-hands, defined as follows:
aρσ =
1
m
3n∑
ν=1
mν
∂xν
∂pρ
∂xν
∂pσ
(B.3)
aρσλµ =
3n∑
ν=1
mν
∂aνσ
∂pλ
∂aνρ
∂pµ
(B.4)
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Despite their differences, (B.1) and (B.2) are simply two expressions for the curvature of a
path through configuration space; i.e. the quantity that we wish to minimize.
As we have seen, if r < 3n then the general coordinates themselves incorporate at
least some of the system’s connections.1 Any further connections can be represented by k
‘equations of condition’ of the following form (§130):2
r∑
ρ=1
pχρp
′
ρ = 0 (B.5)
Each one of these equations acts as a constraint equation, exactly analogous to f(p1, ..., pr) =
0. Thus Hertz multiplies the k equations of condition (B.5) by Lagrange multipliers Πχ and
then adds the left hand side of these equations to the partial differentials of (B.2). In this
way, Hertz derives necessary and sufficient conditions for a path to be a straightest path
(§§158-159):
r∑
σ=1
aρσp
′′
σ +
r∑
σ=1
r∑
τ=1
(
∂aρσ
∂pτ
− 1
2
∂aστ
∂pρ
p′σp
′
τ
)
+
k∑
χ=1
pχρΠχ = 0 (B.6)
These can be used to write down the differential equations of motion for a system, i.e. a
set of differential equations—with time as the independent variable and the coordinates of
the system as the dependent variables—which are sufficient to determine the motion of the
system (when supplemented by initial conditions). Introducing Pχ as an abbreviation for
mv2 Πχ, the differential equations of motion that Hertz derives are the following (§371):
m
(
r∑
σ=1
aρσp¨σ +
r∑
σ=1
r∑
τ=1
∂aρσ
∂pτ
− 1
2
∂aστ
∂pρ
p˙σp˙τ
)
+
k∑
χ=1
pχρPχ = 0 (B.7)
We can employ the acceleration vector to write these equations in a much more condensed
form. This is because the component of a system’s acceleration in the direction of each
1If the general coordinates incorporate all the system’s connections, then r is equal to the system’s
degrees of freedom; if the general coordinates incorporate a proper subset of the system’s connections, then
the number of the system’s degrees of freedom is less than r. See above, chapter 3 section 3.5.
2Note that the number of degrees of freedom of a system is independent of the choice of coordinates (cf.
§136).
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coordinate is (§277):
fρ =
r∑
σ=1
aρσp¨σ +
r∑
σ=1
r∑
τ=1
(
∂aρσ
∂pτ
− 1
2
∂aστ
∂pρ
)
p˙σp˙τ (B.8)
Thus a system’s equations of motion can be written very compactly as follows (§372):
mfρ +
k∑
χ=1
pχρPχ = 0 (B.9)
As we have seen, the only difference for a coupled (unfree) system is that we need to
introduce an additional factor, Pρ:
mfρ +
k∑
χ=1
pχρPχ + Pρ = 0 (B.10)
Setting Pρ to zero for the uncoupled coordinates, we then have a general expression for
the equations of motion for any mechanical system. This is the overarching motivation for
Hertz’s introduction of hidden masses.
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